NA by Miller, Edward G. & Dover, Mark W.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
1998-03
An analysis of federal airport and air carrier
employee access control, screening, and training regulations
Miller, Edward G.





AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AIRPORT AND AIR
CARRIER EMPLOYEE ACCESS CONTROL, SCREENING,
AND TRAINING REGULATIONS
by







Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved
OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction,
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send
comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to
Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA
22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 2. REPORT DATE 3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED
March 1998 Master's Thesis
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AIRPORT AND AIR 5. FUNDING NUMBERS
CARRIER EMPLOYEE ACCESS CONTROL, SCREENING, AND
TRAINING REGULATIONS
6. AUTHOR(S) Edward G. Miller and Mark W. Dover
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5000








The views expressed in this thesis are those ofthe authors and do not reflect the official policy or position of
the Department ofDefense or the U.S. Government.
12a. DISTRIBUTION I AVAILABILITY STATEMENT 12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)
Current Federal Aviation Regulations concerning civil aviation security are focused on countering the threat of a passenger
hijacking a commercial airplane. Current media and government emphasis is focused on a passenger breaching security at an
airport in the U.S. and not an employee breaching security. The security of the U.S. air travel industry from terrorist attacks hinges
on an effective civil aviation security program. Government and aviation industry officials would greatly benefit from the revision
of the current Federal Aviation Regulations concerning civil aviation security to address the issue of terrorism initiated by an
employee.
This thesis provides a thorough examination of current Federal Aviation Regulations parts 107 and 108 sections concerning
airport and air carrier employee access control, screening, and training. Based upon field research of five U.S. airports, the work
furthermore analyzes related issues and problems associated with these regulations and generates recommendations that serve to
enhance security for the traveling public, air carriers, and persons employed by or conducting business at public airports.
14. SUBJECT TERMS









18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF
THIS PAGE
Unclassified






NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. 239·18
ii
.1
AN ANALYSIS OF FEDERAL AIRPORT AND AIR CARRIER EMPLOYEE
ACCESS CONTROL, SCREENING, AND TRAINING REGULATIONS
Edward G. Miller - Lieutenant Commander, United States Navy
B.S., Embry Riddle Aeronautical University, 1986
and
Mark W. Dover, Lieutenant, United States Navy
B.S., Auburn University, 1991
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of





Edward G. Miller Mark W. Dover
Approved by:




Current Federal Aviation Regulations concerning civil aviation security are
focused on countering the threat of a passenger hijacking a commercial airplane. Current
media and government emphasis is focused on a passenger breaching security at an
airport in the U.S. and not an employee breaching security. The security of the U.S. air
travel industry from terrorist attacks hinges on an effective civil aviation security
program. Government and aviation industry officials would greatly benefit from the
revision of the current Federal Aviation Regulations concerning civil aviation security to
address the issue of terrorism initiated by an employee.
This thesis provides a thorough examination of current Federal Aviation
Regulations parts 107 and 108 sections concerning airport and air carrier employee access
control, screening, and training. Based upon field research of five U.S. airports, the work
furthermore analyzes related issues and problems associated with these regulations and
generates recommendations that serve to enhance security for the traveling public, air
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The following is an analysis of current Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
regulations concerning airport and airport employee security and their application in the
field. Our purpose is to analyze the effectiveness of the specific Federal Aviation
Regulation (FAR) Parts 107 and 108 sections pertaining to Airport and Air Carrier
Employee Access Control, Screening, and Training procedures. 1
These regulations require each airport operator to implement and enforce airport
security. Specifically, FAR 107 mandates implementation of an FAA approved Airport
Security Program (ASP) by each individual airport that provides airport security for air
carriers providing scheduled air service operations against the threat of hijacking. FAR
108 requires each airplane operator to implement and enforce procedures that protect
aircraft and facilities providing scheduled air service operations against the threat of
hijacking.
The intent of this thesis is to generate recommendations useful for enhancing
security for the traveling public, air carriers, and persons employed by or conducting
business at public airports by increasing employee awareness ofand compliance with
civil aviation security measures. This is important given that most media and
government emphasis is currently focused on a passenger breaching security at an airport
I Research focuses on (1) Ai{port Access Control: sections 107.14 - Access Control System, 107.25 -
Airport Identification Media, 108.13 - Security ofAirplanes and Facilities, (2) Employee Screening:
sections 107.2 and 108.4 - Falsification, 107.3 1 and 108.33 - Access investigation, and (3) Employee
Training: section 108.3 1- Employment standards for screening personnel.
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in the United States (U.S.) and not an employee breaching security. Incidents suggest
security may be easily breached by a disgruntled or amoral employee. For purposes of
this thesis, an employee is defined as any worker of an airport, airport tenant activity, or
airline operating in or through the airport.
This first chapter provides a brief background history ofFAR 107 and 108 and a
summary of the terrorist threat and the need for secure air travel. It further discusses the
significance of the research, research scope and method, and intended application of the
thesis.
A. FAR 107 AND 108 BACKGROUND
In response to a rise ofhijacking incidents, and to ensure the security of airports
serving scheduled air carriers, the FAA issued FAR 107 on March 18, 1972 and FAR 108
on 15 January, 1981. These regulations require airports to implement prescribed security
measures by developing and observing an airport specific security program. These
regulations are primarily directed towards countering the threat ofhijacking. However,
since the inception ofFAR 107 and 108 the terrorist threat has shifted from hijacking
towards more lethal means ofachieving terrorist goals.
In the last two decades, the hostile takeover of Trans World Airlines (TWA) flight
847 in Beirut, Lebanon, the devastating explosion ofPan American (pan Am) flight 103
over Lockerbie, Scotland, and the recent destruction ofTWA flight 800 have shown U.S.
policy makers that our air transport industry is as vulnerable as the rest of the world to
criminal acts of terrorism. The loss ofTWA flight 800 served to renew the battle against
2
air-terrorism. Even though the cause of this last disaster appears to be mechanical failure,
the incident suggests that something must be done to prevent future air catastrophes.
B. THE TERRORIST THREAT AND THE NEED FOR SECURE AIR
TRAVEL
Terrorists make it their business to threaten the most basic ofhuman rights, the
right to life. The civil aviation industry has, since its inception, been dedicated to
protecting the overall safety ofpassengers and crews. It is the incredibly good safety
record of the world's airlines that has helped to make air travel such a phenomenally
successful mode of transport, and one of the fastest growing industries in the world.
Even if there were no legal regulations on the airlines and airports to provide security, the
industry would recognize the moral obligation resting on the government and the civil
aviation community to take all reasonable measures to protect passengers, employees,
and the public in general, against the threat ofaviation terrorism.
The 1991 Arabian Gulf War demonstrated that if the public develops a real fear of
flying and no longer trusts the capability ofgovernments and aviation authorities to deter
and prevent terrorist attacks, they will simply refuse to use the airlines as a travel mode.
In the first week of the war the Association ofEuropean Airlines claimed that its
members lost 25 percent of their traffic. Airline Business magazine estimated that the
industry as whole was losing approximately 1.5 billion dollars per month in the
immediate aftermath of the war. [Ref. 14: p.103] The industry has every reason to fear
the effects of any future major conflict in the Middle East and the potential accompanying
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threat of increased terrorism. What counts is the public's perception of the risks
involved. Whereas airlines used to argue that they could not afford effective security,
they must now realize that they cannot afford not to have an effective aviation security
system.
Government and the public have other powerful reasons, in addition to the
principle ofprotecting the lives of the innocent, which should compel them to help create
effective aviation security. The U.S. has a vital interest in the maintenance oflawful
authority and the rule oflaw. By resorting to lethal tactics terrorists brutally defy the
authority of the law. It would be absurd to argue that individual acts of aviation terrorism
threaten the survival of the U.S. Yet it would also be irrational to deny that the U.S. has a
vital interest in the defeat and eradication ofgroups that commit major crimes such as
terrorism, and that weakness in responding to terrorist attacks may lead to the dangerous
policy.ofmaking major concessions to terrorists, thus encouraging other terrorist groups
to use similar tactics.
There is another major argument for establishing an effective aviation security
system, and it is one which should add far greater urgency to our efforts. This suggests
that the threat posed by aviation terrorists has become infmitely more lethal over the past
decade. Twenty years ago the major terrorist threat to aviation was hijacking, a problem
that has by no means disappeared. However, the danger ofhijacking has been sharply
reduced by a combination of simple but effective technology, procedures, and the
deterrent effect of inescapable apprehension or death of the hijackers upon landing of the
affected aircraft.
Over the past two decades terrorists have switched the emphasis away from
hijacking to other more lethal means. This includes smuggling a bomb on board an
airliner and timing it to explode in mid air, as was demonstrated in the horror of the Pan
Am flight 103 disaster. When a bomb explodes on an airliner at an altitude of over
30,000 feet, the passengers and crew have no chance of survival. The potential for very
much higher levels ofcasualties exist if an airliner were to be blown up above a major
population center. Modem plastic explosives and sophisticated timing mechanisms
provide an ideal terrorist weapon for this purpose. The huge payload capacities of
modem jumbo jets serve to maximize the carnage.
Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 107 and 108 are geared primarily to confront
the hijacking threat. The magnetometer archways and X ray machines introduced in the
early 1970's were designed to prevent passengers from smuggling metallic objects and
potential hijack weapons on board aircraft. Although the sabotage bomb threat has
become more of a reality over the last decade, the U.S. has moved lethargically in
implementing an Explosive Detection System (EDS), stringent baggage screening
procedures, effective perimeter and access controls, and other necessary countermeasures.
As an example, an airline that is fully capable of coping with this new challenge is
EI Al Airlines of Israel. EI AI compensates for a lack of technologically advanced
equipment by exploiting their unique assets in counter-terrorism intelligence, passenger
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profiling and interrogation, and a comprehensive manual luggage screen. Although much
can be learned from El Al in terms of intelligence, motivation and the importance of the
human factor in aviation security, it would be totally impracticable for the u.s. to adopt
El AI's overall approach. El Al has much less air traffic, no short haul flights, and its
passengers are sufficiently motivated to accept much earlier check-in times than would be
customary for U.S. airlines. Nevertheless, the U.S. must adopt a plan ofattack to counter
the current and future threat ofair terrorism.
C. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH
Terrorism has been, for the most part, a phenomenon afflicting U.S. interests
overseas, and the threat to u.S. civil aviation is assessed to be higher abroad than it is
domestically. However, the World Trade Center bombing in February 1993 indicates that
terrorism is also a very real threat in the United States, and may be on the rise.
The number of international terrorist attacks against U.S. interests rose between
1995 and 1996 more than 66 percent. [Ref. 8:p.8] The Department Of State (DOS)
asserts that U.S. domestic targets are not immune to international terrorism, describing
the terrorist threat as "real and potentially lethal." The DOS views these developments as
cause for concern.
Given the increased demand for air travel in the last decade and the more lethal
tactics of terrorists, a thorough analysis ofFAR 107 and 108 concerning airport and air
carrier employee access control, screening, and training is necessary to assure that the
U.S. is prepared to counter the threat of terrorism in the future.
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D. RESEARCH SCOPE AND METHOD
This research is confined primarily to the analysis of FAR 107 and 108 Airport
and Air Carrier Employee Access Control, Employee Screening, and Employee Training.
Research data concerning FAR 107 and 108 were gathered from the following sources:
1. Published studies and literature from the Federal Register, Government
Printing Office (GPO), FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security (ACS), General
Accounting Office (GAO), DOT office ofIG, DOS, libraries and current press
reports.
2. Statements gained from interviews with u.S. airport management and security
officials.
3. Statements gained from interviews with U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation
(FBI) and FAA agents.
Thesis conclusions are partly based upon opinions advanced by these sources.
E. RESEARCH APPLICATION
The FAA and U.S. airports, in particular, are the intended primary beneficiaries of
this research. The FAA, and airport officials and planners may be able to apply the
infonnation gained to possibly improve the overall security of the U.S. air travel system.
Through these recommendations, a more effective practice ofindividual and corporate
responsibility for complying with security regulations may be achieved for all U.S.
Category X, One, Two, Three, Four and Five airports. The Department OfDefense
(DOD) may also benefit from these findings in managing the operations of common user
7
air lift terminals such as Naval Air Station (NAS) Norfolk, Dover Air Force Base (AFB),
and Travis AFB.
8
II. FAR 107 AND 108 DEVELOPMENT
A proper understanding of a Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR) requires
knowledge of the important issues surrounding its development. This chapter, therefore,
provides a background summary ofFAR 107 and 108, a presentation of significant
employee-initiated security incidents relating to employee security and a plain language
description of these regulations.
A. FAR 107 AND 108 BACKGROUND
Created in 1958 under the Federal Aviation Act (Public Law 85-726), the Federal
Aviation Administration (FAA) is responsible for ensuring the safety and security ofair
travel. Specifically, the Federal Aviation Act directs the Administrator of the FAA to
prescribe regulations requiring the screening of all passengers and carry on baggage for
weapons, and requires regulations to protect persons and property aboard aircraft from
acts of criminal violence and piracy.
As part of that mission, the FAA Office of Civil Aviation Security (ACS) was
established to issue security requirements, inspect airline and airport security operations
and issue civil penalties for noncompliance with those requirements. At U.S. airports,
security is designed as a joint endeavor between airport and airplane operators.
The first hijacking of a U.S. flag air carrier occurred in 1961. The U.S. Congress
responded to this threat by issuing the Anns Export Control Act as a means to counter the
proliferation ofarmed passengers on all flights in or out of the U.S. [Ref 2:p.27] As a
,9
means to provide further direction to the operators and to secure the industry against the
growing threat of hijacking, the FAA issued FAR 107 on 18 March 1972.
The U.S. aviation security system that has evolved since the passage ofFAR 107
has been fundamentally effective in countering the threat of terrorism. This is significant
considering the tremendous growth of the air travel industry and the number of air
carriers over the last two decades both domestically and internationally, mainly due to the
passage of the Airline Deregulation Act of 1977. This growth in the number of air
carriers following economic deregulation of the air industry prompted the FAA to release
FAR 108 on 15 January, 1981 in order to provide air carriers with their own set of
regulations, specifically designed to provide quidance in countering the threat of
hijacking.
FAR 107 and 108 have been amended on several occasions, but they have neyer
undergone a comprehensive update. Tragic events such as Pan American Airlines (Pan
Am) flight 103 and Trans World Airlines (TWA) flight 800 led to unified efforts from
government and industry officials to strengthen aviation security around the world,
particularly at U.S. airports. The FAA responded to these events by issuing emergency
amendments to airport security programs, citing FAR 107 and 108 authority.
The destruction ofPan Am flight 103 on 21 December, 1988 prompted a series of
recommendations from the Bush Commission to improve and change specific civil
aviation security regulations. Most of these recommendations became law with the
Aviation Security Improvement Act (Public Law 101-604), enacted 16 November 1990.
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This Act specifically required the FAA to accomplish the following milestones no later
than November 1993: [Ref.2:p.24]
1. Speed up explosives-detection equipment research and development.
2. Heighten background security checks on airport personnel.
3. Facilitate the public release ofpassenger manifests within three hours of a
crash.
The Bush Commission was critical of the domestic U.S. civil aviation security
system for failing to provide the proper level ofprotection for the traveling public and
urged major refonns. Additionally, the Bush Commission recommended that the FAA
immediately initiate the planning and analysis necessary to phase additional security
measures into the domestic air travel system. [Ref 2:p.27] The 1990 Act mandated many
changes to airport and air carrier security programs, as well as federal staffing and
reporting procedures. Several directives were initiated to impose screening standards for
air crew and security personnel, and training standards and criminal history checks for
certain airport and air carrier personnel. The law also required the FAA to coordinate
with the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to assess the domestic air transport
system, develop security guidelines for airport design and construction, and expand the
security technology research and development program.
In September 1993, the Department OfTransportation (DOT) office ofInspector
General (lG) issued a report critical of certain aspects of the FAA's oversight of airport
security systems. [Ref. 3] This report found significant deficiencies in the effectiveness
11
ofemployee access control and challenge procedures at five U.S. airports. It also
recommended that airport and air carrier implementation ofprocedures for access control
and challenge be strengthened, stressing that the FAA must take steps to increase airport
and air carrier employees' awareness and responsibility for those procedures. The overall
conclusion of this report ultimately criticized the FAA's security regulations, calling
them "inadequate." [Ref. 3:p.ii] The assessment criteria for this report were obtained
from a series ofDOTIG undercover investigations at some of the nation's busiest
international airports. For example, in fifteen of twenty attempts to gain access to posted
airport secure areas, DOTIG agents entered aircraft parking areas and baggage areas, and
on one occasion an unarmed hand grenade was passed undetected through a metal
detector.
In January 1994, the FAA responded to the 1993 DOTIG report by meeting with
representatives of airports, air carriers, airport tenants, employee groups and aviation
worker unions to discuss the report's findings and to emphasize the need for improved
employee security awareness. Simultaneously, the FAA began focused inspections at
U.S. airports with the highest volume and most complex security operations. Slated to
continue on a routine basis, these special inspections target access control, the security
measure that the DOTIG found to be a universal weakness.
Also in January 1994, the General Accounting Office (GAO) issued a report
suggesting further actions the FAA could take to improve civil aviation security. [Ref. 7]
This report was issued in response to a Congressional inquiry on the FAA's efforts to
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implement the Aviation Security Improvement Act. This report found that the milestones
mandated by the Act were not achieved on time by the FAA on time. As a rebuttal to this
failure, the FAA accused Congress of setting overly-stringent standards and requiring
complicated tests of the new technologies, even though the milestone completion
deadlines were almost five years after the Pan Am disaster. The GAO did find, however,
that the FAA had taken some of the most important steps in response to the Act, but
noted that additional steps must be taken to enhance FAA security programs and
initiatives. These actions include:
1. Pilot-testing new procedures before implementation.
2. Strengthening human factors research and its application.
3. Making systematic analytical use of information that the FAA collects during
air carrier and airport security inspections.
4. Providing airport security coordinators with security clearances, so that they
can be given classified information regarding threats to civil aviation.
Similar to the 1993 DOTIG report, the GAO report highlighted the need for the
FAA to increase industry employees' overall awareness of security measures. The report
concluded that the FAA must refine security training and procedures to increase
employee sensitivity to security requirements.
The FAA maintains that all provisions of the 1990 Act have been fully
implemented. However, the DOTIG office completed a follow up report in July 1996
that presented evidence which contradicts the FAA's position. [Ref. 4:p.8] This report
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found that many of the same problems identified in the 1993 DOnG report were still
present, and the 1990 Act did not achieve the required milestones to counter air-terrorism.
As security tightened throughout the nation's airports in the wake of the 1996
TWA flight 800 disaster, the Clinton Administration enacted Executive Order 13015 and
established the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security headed by
Vice President Gore (Gore Commission). [Ref. 1:p.3] The Gore Commission produced a
response plan to this incident that contained twenty recommendations and eighteen
projects that are geared to serve as the new antidote for this threat. This response plan
was enacted by the President to supplement the 1990 Aviation Security Improvement
Act.
Given the realities exposed by these reports, and the aviation disasters to date,
countering air-terrorism has become a fundamental concern of the aviation industry. The
Gore Commission states in its Final Report to the President that the threat against civil
aviation is changing and growing, and that the federal government must lead the fight
against it. It recommends that the federal government commit greater resources to
improving aviation security and work more cooperatively with the private sector and
local law enforcement authorities in carrying out security responsibilities.
In passing the Fiscal Year (FY) 1997 Federal spending bill in September 1996,
Congress approved $429.4 million for aviation counter terrorism support that is part ofa
$1.1 billion total counter terrorism package. It is the first piece of what could become a
$6 billion counter terrorism expenditure over the next ten years. [Ref.5:p.33]
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For the six hundred million passengers that utilize the U.S. civil aviation system
annually, the implications of such an expenditure may be enormous. The industry may
seriously confront the challenge of retaining convenience, competitive pricing and ease of
passenger movement in the midst of increased security. As a whole, the passenger air
industry is currently seeking to address the weaknesses identified in the Gore report and
improve compliance. In particular, many airports and air carriers have begun improving
their training programs and instituted programs to provide individual incentives for
compliance including escalating disciplinary action for instances ofnon-compliance. The
FAA proposes to implement similar measures at other airports by clarifying and
modifying airport access control, employee screening, and employee training
requirements.
B. SIGNIFICANT INCIDENTS
Since the inception ofFAR 107 and 108, the primary threat to civil aviation has
evolved beyond hijacking to bombing ofaircraft and murderous attacks within airports.
The following presentation of significant employee, or impersonated employee-initiated
security incidents are indicative of this evolution: [Ref. 12:p.16]
1. September 5, 1986: Terrorist assault on Pan Am Flight 73. Four terrorists
assaulted Flight 73 in Karachi, Pakistan as the aircraft waited to take off .The four
terrorists were dressed as airport security personnel and drove an airport security vehicle
alongside the aircraft. The terrorists stormed the aircraft and after 17 hours of
negotiations, the aircraft's auxiliary power unit failed. Anticipating an attack by security
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forces, the terrorists opened fire on the massed passengers, killing 22 persons and injuring
125 others before security forces could intervene.
2. December 7, 1987: Destruction ofPacific Southwest Airlines (PSA)
Flight 1771. Flight 1771 crashed when a recently terminated airline employee boarded
the Los Angeles to San Francisco flight with a handgun, shot one passenger (his former
supervisor), the flight crew, one flight attendant, and presumably himselfwhile the flight
was airborne. As a result, all 38 passengers and five crew on board were killed. The
terminated employee had managed to retain his airline identificationafter his dismissal
and used it to bypass the passenger screening checkpoint.
3. December 21, 1988: The bombing ofPan Am Flight 103. All 243
passengers and 16 crew on board, plus 11 persons on the ground at Lockerbie, Scotland,
were killed. Subsequent inspection of the reconstructed aircraft determined that a device
consisting ofplastic explosives hidden inside a tape cassette player was responsible for its
destruction. The device had been concealed in checked luggage. Individuals working for
the Government ofLibya are thought to be responsible for the bombing. One probable
conspirator was the former manager of the Libyan Arab Airlines (LAA) office in Valletta,
Malta and had retained full access to the airport after his dismissal. Using this access
privilege and other knowledge gained as representatives ofLAA, the conspirators
bypassed security checks at Valletta's Luqa Airport and inserted the suitcase containing
the bomb into baggage ofan Air Malta flight to Frankfurt. The bomb was a time delay
type and was scheduled to detonate over the Atlantic Ocean, however, the terrorist's
, 16
calculations were wrong.
4. August 14, 1990: Gunman gained unauthorized access to the Air
Operations Area (AOA) at Washington National Airport. The gunman, anned with a .38
caliber revolver, entered the Ogden Allied Services garage and held several employees at
gunpoint. The gunman was a former employee at Ogden and had voluntarily left his job.
He commandeered a fuel truck, forced an Ogden employee to drive onto the AOA and
commenced fIring several shots at a second Ogden fuel truck, wounding two persons. He
was in possession of30 to 40 rounds ofammunition when he was arrested. A molotov
cocktail was also recovered from the commandeered fuel truck, and several other ones
were found in the gunman's vehicle.
These are but four of the two hundred and eighty nine terrorist attacks that have
been reported by airports throughout the world during the past 5 years. These attacks
have included 59 airport attacks, 4 bombings and shootings onboard aircraft, 28 shootings
at aircraft, 79 commandeering's, 89 hijacking's, 28 general aviation (GA) incidents and
79 off airport attacks. At least 41 persons have been killed and more than 250 injured in
attacks at airports between 1992 and 1996. [Ref 6:p.83]
C. FAR 107 AND 108 SUMMARIES
Sections ofFAR 107 and 108 specifIcally pertaining to Airport and Air Carrier
Employee Access Control, Employee Screening, and Employee Training procedures are
provided in the following paragraphs in plain language format. In general, FAR 107
mandates implementation ofan FAA approved Airport Security Program (ASP) that
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provides security ofairports, for air carriers providing scheduled air service operations,
and against the threat ofhijacking. FAR 108 requires each air carrier to implement and
enforce procedures that protect aircraft and facilities providing scheduled air service
operations against the threat ofhijacking. The current regulations, in their official FAA
language, are provided in the Appendix for reader reference.
1. Employee Access Control
Sections 107.l4-Access Control System, 107.25-Airport Identification Media,
and 108.I3-Security ofAirplanes and Facilities all pertain to the issue ofexercising
authority over employee access to all secured areas included within the AOA ofa U.S.
airport.
Section 107.14 mandates a security plan for perimeter boundaries of the airport to
be implemented by the airport operator. This security must be a system, method, or
procedure which meets FAA requirements for controlling access to secured areas of
airports. To differentiate between persons authorized to have access to particular portions
ofthe secured areas and persons authorized to have access only to other portions or to the
entire secured area, the system, method, or procedure shall be capable of limiting an
individual's access by time and date.
Section 107.25 establishes minimum security standards for the issuance ofairport
identification media to airport employees operating within the Security Identification
Display Area (SIDA). It prescribes directives that prevent the issuance ofmedia that
allows unescorted access to this area unless the proper FAA approved SIDA training has
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been completed and documented by the Airport Security Coordinator (ASC).
Section 108.13 provides guidance for the airport to mandate the implementation
of the ASP by all air carriers in their airplanes and facilities. It gives guidance to air
carriers to prohibit unauthorized access to the airplane, for a responsible agent to properly
inspect and handle all baggage, to require identification ofpersons shipping goods or
cargo onboard an airplane, to handle all goods and cargo so as to prohibit unauthorized
access, and to conduct a preflight security inspection of the airplane.
2. Employee Screening
Sections 107.2 and 108.4-Falsification, and 107.31 and 108.33-Access
Investigation all pertain to the issue of employee screening procedures at a U.S. airport.
The sections regarding Falsification and Access Investigation have been combined in this
presentation because they are verbatim in their official form.
Sections 107.2 and 108.4 address the possibility of fraudulent or intentionally
false statements made by airport and air carrier employment applicants in their employee
screening records. This section is intended to provide a firm means for the FAA to take
legal enforcement action against individuals who make such statements in employment
applications.
Sections 107.31 and 108.33 require airport and airplane operators to conduct a
pre-employment investigation of applicants to disqualify individuals convicted of certain
enumerated crimes from having, or being able to authorize others to have, unescorted
access privileges to a SIDA of a U.S. airport. These standards delineate specific items
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required of employers in order to prevent the hiring of individuals that have committed
crimes as listed in these sections. This section also mandates that individuals undergo a
review that explains their previous 10 years ofemployment history. This is in
conjunction with verification of the previous 5 years ofhistory conducted by the potential
employer which includes verification ofemployment data by the individual's previous
employer in writing, by documentation, telephone, or in person. This section also
prescribes that if a 12 month gap in employment exists within the individual's 10 year
employment history verification or if the individual can not support statements made in
the 5 year verification, then the individual is required to explain these discrepancies and
the potential employer may request a check of the individual's fingerprints held by the
FBI.
3. Employee Training
Section 108.13 mandates minimum employment standards required ofemployees
in capacities that are involved with the screening ofpassengers and baggage in U.S.
airports. These standards include education and experience, aptitudes, physical
coordination, visual and aural acuity, color perception, and motor skills. These
requirements are necessary in order to properly operate screening equipment, hear and
respond to alarms and instructions, conduct physical searches, and write reports.
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III. THE U.S. AIRPORT SYSTEM <
A detailed analysis ofFederal Aviation Regulations (FAR) 107 and 108, and their
implementation, requires some understanding of the specific security characteristics of
U.S. airports. This chapter therefore provides a profile of the current U.S. airport security
system by discussing the following:
A. Operational classification of airports.
B. Security classification ofairports.
C. Security responsibilities.
D. Classification of security areas.
E. Security alert levels.
F. Security tools.
A. OPERATIONAL CLASSIFICATION OF AIRPORTS
Airports are classified into three categories according to the annual level of
passenger boardings (enplanements) the airport conducts. This classification system
assists the Department OfTransportation (DOT) in identifying airports that serve public
air transportation, that are critical to supporting national security, and that are eligible for
federal aid. [Ref. 15:p.36] The three airport operational categories are: 1) commercial
service, 2) general aviation (GA), and 3) reliever.
Commercial service airports receive scheduled passenger service and have 2,500
or more annual passenger boardings. There are currently 566 commercial service airports
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in the U.S. Commercial airports are partitioned into two sub-classifications: 1) Primary,
and 2) Other. Primary Airports are commercial service airports with 10,000 or more
annual enplanements. There are currently 417 primary commercial service airports in the
U.S. The remaining 149 commercial airports are classified as Other commercial service
airports with 2,500 to 10,000 annual enplanements.
General aviation (GA) airports are those with fewer than 2,500 annual
enplanements. There are currently 2,424 GA airports in the U.S. Reliever Airports are a
special category ofGA airports that are located in the vicinity ofmajor commercial
airports. These airports are specifically designated by the FAA as GA airports that
provide relief to congested major airports. To be classified as a reliever airport, the
airport must have at least 50 pennanent based aircraft, manage 25,000 itinerant operations
from other airports or 35,000 unscheduled transient aircraft operations within the last two
years. [Ref. 15:p.36] There are currently 329 reliever airports in the U.S.
B. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF AIRPORTS
Unlike the operational classification, airports are also classified into six security
categories according to the annual number ofpassengers screened for security purposes.
The six airport security categories are Category X, and Category One through Five.
Airports that require the highest level of security are Category X. Currently 19
U.S. airports retain this classification. The following types of airports may be designated
Category X:
1. Airports where 25 million or more persons are screened annually.
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2. Airports having 1 million or more international enplanements.
3. Airports with special considerations (e.g.; history of incidents, airports in
unique locations such as those serving Washington, D.C.).
Category One airports are those where more than 2 million persons are screened
annually. Category Two airports are those with at least 500,000 but less than 2 million
persons screened annually. Category Three airports are those with less than 500,000
persons screened annually. Category Four airports are those that conduct screening for
flights that deplane passengers into a Sterile Area (SA) at another airport, in this case the
total number ofpersons screened is insignificant. Category Five airports are those where
screening is not required and that serve aircraft seating 31 through 60 passengers.
C. SECURITY RESPONSIBILITIES
Provision of security in U.S. air travel is the responsibility of: 1) the FAA, 2)
airports, and 3) air carriers.
1. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
The FAA is responsible for ensuring the safety ofair travel through the
establishment of security requirements, inspection of airline and airport security
operations, and by issuing civil penalties for noncompliance with those requirements.
The operational role of the FAA in airport security is limited to the dissemination of
intelligence and threat infonnation.
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2. Airports
Airports are responsible for security on airport property. They are charged with
providing a secure operational environment for the air carrier. To achieve this, the FAA
has established security requirements for the response of law enforcement to various
security threats, physical security such as airport perimeter fencing, and access
restrictions to operations areas. Specifically, airports are responsible for securing access
to the Airport Operations Area (ADA) by controlling the movement ofpersons and
vehicles and providing the general law enforcement response to any security breaches or
problems.
3. Air Carriers
Air carriers are responsible for the most visible security measures. These
measures include the screening ofpassengers and carry-on baggage, including training
and testing ofpersons responsible for the screening, securing the aircraft against the
introduction ofany explosive or incendiary devices, monitoring and securing all sterile
areas under their control, and controlling the handling and loading ofbaggage and cargo.
[Ref.2:p.47] Air carriers may contract with private security firms to perform this
function, and the carriers at a given airport will often work together. Nevertheless, the
FAA holds the individual air carriers accountable for the effectiveness of screening
operations.
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D. CLASSIFICATION OF SECURITY AREAS
Effective security areas are a critical cornerstone of airport security. This requires
clear definition of security areas, establishment ofbaseline security requirements for
designated areas, and effective enforcement of established security procedures for these
areas. The FAA has identified five such security areas: 1) Air Operations Area (AOA), 2)
Secure Area (SA), 3) Security Identification Display Area (SIDA), 4) Sterile Area, and 5)
Exclusive Area (EA).
1. Air Operations Area
As explained in FAR 107, airport operators are required to designate a portion of
the airport where security measures are applied to protect areas used for landing, taking
off, or surface maneuvering ofairplanes. As defined, the AOA encompasses the (l)
runway, (2) taxiway, (3) ramp, (4) parking, (5) tarmac, and (6) undeveloped areas within
the airport perimeter.
FAR 107.13 defines requirements for operators of airports serving scheduled
passenger operations where the certificate holder of air carrier is required to conduct
passenger screening under a program required by FAR 108. Airports shall use the
procedures included, and the facilities and equipment described in its approved Airport
Security Plan (ASP), to perform the following functions:
1. Control access to the AOA, including methods for preventing the entry of
unauthorized persons and ground vehicles.
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2. Control movement ofpersons and ground vehicles within each ADA,
including, when appropriate, requirements for the display of identification.
3. Prompt detection and action to control each penetration, or attempted
penetration, ofan ADA by person whose entry is not authorized in accordance
with the Airport Security Program (ASP).
2. Secure Area
The Secure Area (SA) was created by the issuance ofFAR 107.14 in January
1989 in response to the 1987 Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA) disaster (discussed in
Chapter II). The SA encompasses the area where air carriers enplane passengers, deplane
passengers, sort and load baggage, and any adjacent areas that are not separated by
security controls or physical barriers. [Ref. 16:pA] Under FAR 107.14, access control
systems must:
1. Ensure that only authorized persons gain access to the SA.
2. Immediately deny access to persons whose authorization is revoked.
3. Differentiate between persons with unlimited access to the SA and persons
with only partial access.
4. Be capable of limiting access by time and date.
3. Security Identification Display Area
Almost three years after FAA required airports to designate the Secure Area
within airports, they mandated airport operators to implement additional identification
display and training procedures to provide even more protection to carrier aircraft within
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a portion of the AOA. This new area, designated the Security Identification Display Area
(SIDA), includes portions of the AOA which overlap with the SA. Per FAR 107.25, this
area is defined as any area identified in the airport security program as requiring each
person to continuously display on their outennost gannent, an airport-approved
identification medium unless under airport-approved escort.
SIDA areas vary from airport to airport. For example, San Francisco/Oakland
(SFO) International Airport designates the entire ADA a SIDA, whereas Los Angeles
(LAX) International Airport designates only specific areas of the AOA as SIDA.
Though designated SIDA areas vary per airport, FAA requirements do not. Per
FAR 107.23 no airport may issue to any person any identification media that provides
unescorted access to any SIDA unless the person has successfully completed training in
accordance with an FAA-approved curriculum specified in the ASP. The curriculum
specified in the ASP shall detail the methods of instruction, provide attendees the
opportunity to ask questions, and include at least the following topics:
1. Control, use, and display ofairport-approved identification or media.
2. Challenge procedures and the law enforcement response which supports the
challenge procedures.
3. Restrictions on divulging infonnation concerning an act of unlawful
interference with civil aviation if such infonnation is likely to jeopardize the
safety of domestic or international aviation.
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4. Non-disclosure of information regarding the airports security system or any
airport tenant's security systems.
5. Other topics deemed necessary by the Assistant Administrator for Civil
Aviation Security (ACS).
No person may use any airport approved identification medium that provides
unescorted access to any SIDA unless that medium was issued to that person by the
appropriate airport authority or other entity whose identification is approved by the
airport operator. Examples of "other entities" include the FAA, U.S. Customs, and tenant
air carriers. The airport operator shall maintain a record ofall training given to each
person under this section until 180 days after the termination of that person's unescorted
access privileges.
4. Sterile Area
Per FAR 108.3, the Sterile Area is an area to which access is controlled by the
inspection ofpersons and property in accordance with an approved security program used
in accordance with FAR 129.25. Specifically the Sterile Area is the public area entered
after passing through passenger screening checkpoints. Security of the Sterile Area is the
responsibility of the air carriers.
5. Exclusive Area
The Exclusive Area (EA) is a dedicated area for which carriers are responsible for
physical security in their operational areas leased from the airport. This area includes air
operations, cargo buildings and airline spaces within the terminal building. Specific
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responsibilities include the SIDA requirements, access control system hardware, and
procedures identified in the FAA approved ASP.
E. SECURITY ALERT LEVELS
In order to ensure that the FAA, airport operators, and air carriers are able to
respond on short notice to civil aviation threats, a system of four security alert levels was
devised. Security alert levels are comprised of a myriad ofcontingency action plans
devised for identified threats and vary according to the severity of the threat.
Contingency responses can be as subtle as increasing the number ofon duty security
personnel or as stringent as disallowing curbside check-in, prohibiting visitors from
security areas and/or physical hand searches ofall baggage. The FAA is responsible for
declaring alert levels and contingencies to put in place. The FAA uses two tools for
threat notification and contingency requirements: 1) Security Directives for air carriers,
and 2) Emergency ASP amendments for airports, both ofwhich are time based.
Expiration dates trigger a timely review of the threat and determine continuance,
modification, or elimination ofa countermeasure.
The FAA has the authority to direct the implementation ofactions at specific
operations (airports/air carriers) subject to the threat, instead of industry wide. The
security levels are listed below according to the severity ofthe threat, with Level One
being the least severe and Level Four being the most severe:
1. Level One is implemented when current political tensions may lead to hostile
demonstrations or low level attacks against U. S. citizens or interests.
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2. Level Two indicates that there is information that suggests that groups known
to have attacked civil aviation may be preparing actions against U.S. citizens
or interests or civil disturbances which could affect civil aviation.
3. Level Three indicates that there is information that a terrorist group or hostile
entity with known capability ofattacking civil aviation is likely to carry out
attacks against U.S. interests, or that civil disturbances with a direct impact on
civil aviation have begun or are imminent.
4. Level Four is the highest threat level. This level is implemented when
available information confirms that terrorist organizations with demonstrated
capability are planning an attack against U.S. civil aviation and the highest
level of security possible is required to protect u.s. air travelers.
F. AIRPORT SECURITY TOOLS
As indicated in the news media and current literature, there is no technological
"silver bullet" available today to solve the complexities ofairport security. The only true
silver bullet is a system of layered defenses which terrorists must successfully infiltrate to
reach their objective(s). The structure ofa layered defense is unique to each airport
facility, but the common requirement ofall airport facilities is interaction ofhuman
resources and technology. Technology being used across the U.s. today is a combination
of both old and new systems. This section provides descriptions ofthe following
technologies currently employed in some, but not all, U.S. airports: 1) Electronic
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Detection System, 2) Conventional Weapon Detection, 3) X-ray, and 4) Security Access
Control.
1. Electronic Detection System
Plastic explosives have replaced guns, knives, and dynamite as terrorist weapons
ofchoice. SEMTEX and C4, two of the most common brands ofplastic explosives, pose
serious problems for traditional metal detection systems because they have no metal
content. Early Explosive Detection Systems (EDS) specifically designed to detect
SEMTEX and C4 had high false positive rates making them unsuitable for employment.
Today a technological breakthrough in EDS has yet to be discovered, however, the two
systems currently being tested in Category X airports, have shown promise.
a. InVision CTX-5000
The InVision CTX-5000 is the only luggage screening device certified by
the FAA as an EDS for plastic explosives and other weapons that are essentially
"invisible" to all previously utilized security equipment. The CTX 5000 offers a three-
dimensional slice through the suitcase, like a medical CAT scan, that gives information
on both the shape and density ofmaterials, and can automatically alert an security
employee to suspicious objects. [Ref. 17:p.4]
This new technology has proven to be a significant technological advance
in bomb detection, and is being fielded throughout the world. Though large (6 ft. x 14
ft.), costly ($1,000,000 per unit), and relatively slow (150 bags per hour), thirty-two CTX
units have been sold worldwide. Only five CTX units are in operation at category X
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airports in the United States today, three ofwhich are located at SFO, Atlanta-Hartsfield,
and New York's John F. Kennedy (JFK). This is due to FAA funding constraints, and the
U.S. government's classification of this technology as a research and development project
instead of a procurement project.
b. Ion Mobility Spectroscope (lMS)
While the CTX 5000 searches for large concentrations of explosives,
portable trace detection systems are used to detect small or trace amounts of explosive
material. Commonly known as "sniffers" these detectors are used for screening
passengers and carry-on baggage for minute amounts of chemicals. Portable systems of
this type are actively being used at sterile area screening points in some Category X
airports. IMS screening is performed on suspect as well as randomly selected baggage.
2. Weapon Detection
Since 1972 the U.S. has been utilizing Magnetometers (metal detectors) to search
passengers for detection of firearms, knives and other metal-based weapons.
Magnometers have proven to be a highly successful in thwarting hijacking. However,
these devices were not designed for nor can they detect explosives. All passengers must
be screened prior to entering the sterile area through use ofa stationary walk-through
device. Hand held magnetometer devices are used to pinpoint magnetic based items on
individuals who fail walk through screening.
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3. Xray
As with Magnetometers, x-ray devices have been in use since the early 1970's as
the primary weapon detection device. Displayed images indicate object density, and
image interpretation is a function of the screeners' training and abilities. All carry-on
items and checked international baggage are required to undergo x-ray screening,
however, checked domestic baggage is not. [Ref 13]
4. Security area access control
Key to an effective access control program is positive control of security areas.
Airports have installed different types of equipment in different locations. Some airports
screen persons at checkpoints, while other airports have installed controls on doors
beyond such checkpoints. Some airports have installed controls on both sides of doors
leading into and out of the security area. [Ref. 16:p.5]
To secure doors and gates, magnetic stripe card readers (with and without
integrated key pads), proximity card readers, biometric readers, electronic fences and
passenger exit lanes control systems are utilized. Some airports have guarded gates with
magnetic stripe card readers to separate passenger and cargo operations areas.
Additionally, some airports have mounted closed circuit television cameras at doors and
gates while others have chosen not to install such technology. [Ref. 16:p.5]
This subsection describes the types of technology available for use in an access
control system:
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a. Magnetic Stripe Card Readers (MSCR)
MSCR have been in existence since the early 1960's for control of entry
points. The heart of a MSCR system is a central mainframe computer or an integrated
network ofPersonal Computers (PC). Individually issued magnetic stripe cards
(magnetic media) act as keys to access the system. [Ref. 18:p.1] With this system the
employee "swipes" the magnetic media through the reader to open the controlled door or
gate.
Advantages ofa MSCR system is speed and ease of changing entry access
codes, control ofaccess through date and time, digital database ofpersonnel accessing
specific areas, and difficulty of duplicating cards. [Ref. 18:p.2]
b. MSCR with integrated keypad
Essentially the same system as a MCSR except personalized codes must
be entered in unison with swiping of a magnetic media. This system reduces the
possibility ofarea access by individuals using stolen or misplaced media.
c. Proximity Card System (PCS)
PCS uses infrared technology for area access. PCS manufactures use data
transmission and encryption methods between the tag and reader that can't be
counterfeited. With this system, the employee holds the card within a few feet of the
reader to gain access. Unlike a MCSR, media proximity media never touches the reader
and therefore wear is not a function of usage. Ease of use, convenience, speed and
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maintainability are notable qualities of this system. Many MCSR systems are being
replaced by PCS systems. [Ref. 18:p.2]
d. Biometric Identification System (BIS)
BIS is a state-of-the-art security system. Two of the most common BIS
techniques are retinal scan and hand scan. While retinal scan systems identify individuals
by unique retinal properties, a hand scanner maps hand geometry using Three
Dimensional (3D) techniques. [Ref. 28:p.l] While both systems are available, only the
hand scan system is currently being used in U.S. airports today. San Francisco
International (SFO) is one such airport using this technology.
e. Electronic fence
Airports with general aviation (GA) facilities have unique access control
problems. General aviation, unlike airport and air carriers, is made up oflocal and
transient civilian private pilots, self-employed mechanics, and Fixed Base Operator
employees. In order for GA to operate in a SIDA, all users would require SIDA media.
This would be a challenging if not impossible endeavor to manage. To facilitate the
airport's airport security plans and eliminate SIDA requirements, electronic fences are
being used at some airports. Electronic fences are invisible barriers that use sensors to
detect movement and trigger an alarm to alert security personnel when breached.
f. Passenger Exit Lane Control System
This system is designed to prevent entry into Sterile Areas through exit
lanes. The motion-sensor system issues an audible warning, flashes security lighting and
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produces a photo of the individual within seconds ofactivation. The system is
independent ofbreach speed (walk, run, crawl) and can catch a person going the wrong
way against a crowd of as many as 20 persons. This system is currently installed at SFO
and Minneapolis/St. Paul International. [Ref 5:p.33]
g. Closed Circuit Television Systems (CCTV)
Airports ofall categories use CCTV as part of their security system.
CCTV has the ability to detect and record movements ofpersonnel entering access
control areas as well as selected ingress and egress points on the airfield. [Ref 29:p.l]
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IV. ANALYSIS OF FAR 107 AND 108 AIRPORT AND AIR CARRIER
EMPLOYEE ACCESS CONTROL, SCREENING, AND TRAINING
REGULATIONS
This chapter is a comparison of the current Federal Aviation Regulation (FAR)
107 and 108 sections pertaining to airport and air carrier employee access control,
screening, and training, and the current application of these regulations in the field. Field
research was conducted at two Category X airports, two Category One airports, one
Category Two airport, and a site visit to one Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)
regional Office of Civil Aviation Security (ACS). This consisted ofapproximately 35
hours interviewing airport operations, security and screening personnel. In addition,
ongoing interactive communication was maintained with the FAA ACS and these
airports.
The consensus gained from our research regarding the effectiveness ofcurrent
U.S. aviation security policy is that it is effective in deterring hijackers. Moreover, U.S.
air carriers have not experienced a single hijacking in the last five years. [Ref. 6:p.84]
The U.S. has only experienced two percent of the worldwide terrorist incidents against
civil aviation in the last five years. [Ref. 6:p.83] From this data it could be interpreted
that the threat against U.S. civil aviation is minimal, however, it is not. An indicator of
this fact is a plot uncovered by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in 1995 that
fortunately did not occur. This was the 1995 plan to place explosive devices on 12 U.S.
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airliners in the Far East for which international terrorist Rarnzi Yousefwas convicted in
1996. Rarnzi Yousefis the suspected mastermind behind the World Trade Center
bombing and was convicted of bombing Philippine Airlines flight 434 in 1994. [Ref.
6:p.49]
Since the inception ofFAR 107 and 108, deterrence of terrorist attacks on airports
or aircraft has been focused on the passenger, however, terrorist attacks by employees are
just as conceivable. The major discrepancy ofthe current security regulations is the
absence of standards for (l) access control systems, (2) employee background checks,
and (3) training ofemployees in Airport Security Program (ASP) policies and procedures.
Our analysis covers the following topics:
A. Employee Access Control
1. 107.14-Access Control System
2. 107.25-Airport Identification Media
3. 108.13-Security ofAirplanes and Facilities
B. Employee Screening
1. 107.31 and 108.33-Access investigation
2. 107.2 and 108.4-Falsification
C. Employee Training
1. 108.31-Employment standards for screening personnel
Through this analysis, a more detailed assessment of the effectiveness of the
current form ofFAR 107 and 108 can be made.
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A. ACCESS CONTROL
"The strongest castle walls are not proof against a traitor within." This ancient
proverb captures the significance of the analysis contained within this section. While it is
the rule for passengers and some employees to pass through metal detectors and answer
security questions at the air carrier's ticket counter before accessing the aircraft gate and
other restricted areas of the airport, it is not the rule for all employees.
Access control systems, identification media, and security of airplanes and
facilities are all fundamental elements of the system, method, and/or procedure approved
in the airport operator's ASP that provides security in the Air Operations Area (AOA).
1. l07.14-Access Control System
The implementation of 107.14 produced many different access control systems
nationwide as the FAA did not mandate a standard access control system in all u.S.
airports. Because ofthis non-standardization, and the consequent reduction in
accountability, problems have arisen at individual airports that inhibit proper security.
[Ref. 9]
Perhaps a benefit of non-standardization is that it allows individual airports to
tailor their ASP to their specific needs. Given the freedom to choose the best system for
their needs, most U.S. airports choose the system that allows them to focus on facilitating
greater passenger convenience and throughput, therefore resulting in better utilization of
aircraft and ultimately achieving greater airport revenues. This approach is optimal for
U.S. airport and air carrier profits. Although the provision of airport security is required
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to some degree by all U.S. airports, it is an issue that is viewed as a hindrance to business
by operators, and is routinely ranked as a low priority, until an incident occurs. [Ref 19]
One consequence ofnon-standardization is the problems transient air crews
confront when operating through different airports injob functions that require access to
controlled areas. The current regulation only requires that there be a system, method,
and/or procedure to control access to controlled areas of the airport via identification
media. As a result ofthe regulation's language requiring only "a" system, method, or
procedure and not a specific one, transient air crews must carry different identification
media, if authorized to acquire it, for unescorted access through the controlled areas.
Otherwise, they must be escorted, which employs security personnel away from their
regular duties for that time period. Frequent delays in getting to aircraft regularly occur
because of restrictions on access to the same security areas at every airport, therefor~
resulting in delayed flights.
Other problems arise from the inability ofa security employee at an access
checkpoint to effectively scrutinize identification media of transient air crews if they do
not possess identification media from the airport they are operating through. Due to the
variety of access control systems nationwide, access checkpoint employees do not have
the immediate capability ofaccurately identifying transient air crews. This inability to
communicate between the different systems is a hindrance to proper identification of
these air crews. For example, our research examined this problem at one location. An
international airport that does not have a local aircraft maintenance facility frequently
40
requires technicians to visit the airport to perform maintenance on aircraft. This
technician requires access to the AOA, but does not have identification from the host
airport. Due to this, the host airport grants access based upon the technician's access
identification from his or her resident airport or a telephone call to that airport to verify
his or her identification, if during normal business hours, or, if after hours, the call is even
answered. Now say, for example, any delay in performing the maintenance results in lost
revenues for every minute the effected aircraft sits idle. In this case access may be
granted without close scrutiny so as to alleviate any delay. The point made in this
example is that a visiting technician is allowed access to the AOA without a thorough
verification of identification. [Ref. 13] This problem would be alleviated if employee
access identification information was placed into a secure, standard, non-proprietary
system with an accessible data base.
Section 107.14 mandates limiting employee access to controlled areas by time and
date. During interviews, employees expressed concern about the burden placed on them
to meet this requirement, specifically, full compliance made it very difficult for them to
accomplish their daily duties. For example, a large majority of employees work overtime
and require access to facilities at irregular times and days, by limiting their access by time
and date, airport operations are subject to disruption. [Ref. 9] Other factors considered in
meeting this requirement are fluctuating aircraft schedules and employees filling in for
other absent coworkers. Most airports use this requirement for contingency purposes,
when only the strictest security measures need to be implemented.
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The issuance of temporary access media to individuals who are not in possession
of their original access media is a regular practice at airports. [Ref. 10] A typical
example of this is an airport employee who shows up for work without his or her
approved access medium and cannot practicably be escorted the entire duration of their
assigned shift. Therefore, temporary access is granted based upon their current
employment status. The existing regulation does not address this situation, but such
temporary access media have been generally prohibited by local FAA guidance. Some
airports require the individual to locate their media before allowing access while others
issue a second access medium to an individual as long as access authorization is verified,
and other specific standards are met.
Escort procedures for persons not in possession of access media are not specified
by the regulation. Many airport operators already have some type ofescort procedure in
place based on FAA policy guidance, but such procedures are applied inconsistently. To
ensure a more consistent application ofthese procedures, the FAA believes escorting
standards should be incorporated into this regulation. [Ref 11]
This regulation does not address the issue of group access to controlled areas.
The airport inspections that were prompted by the Department Of Transportation (DOT)
office ofInspector General (IG) audit in 1993 revealed that, despite best efforts, there are
certain instances where validation ofaccess authority has become operationally
unfeasible. [Ref.4:p.5] An access control system that validates an individual's access
authorization is currently required, however, unauthorized group access, commonly
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known as "piggybacking", often occurs. In such an instance, more than one individual
with assumed authorized access passes through an access point using only a single
employees' access media, without being subject to any control measures that individually
validate authorization.
Our research indicates that the only ways to effectively counter this occurrence is
to execute one or more of the following: (1) place a guard at each access point to
authenticate single-employee access, (2) install a revolving security door at an access
point that limits only one person through at a time, or (3) in the case of vehicle access,
require positive identification of all vehicle occupants and deny all unauthorized
occupant's access. [Ref. 9] Our research also indicates that one more method is used
instead of or in conjunction with the above. Some airports impose incentives in the form
offines and suspensions to employees that are caught piggybacking. For example, LAX
revokes the employee's identification media for the first incident and makes their
previous employer re-submit the proper forms, then makes them pay 75 dollars to re-
acquire their media. The second incident results in the same, coupled with a suspension
of 5 work days. The third incident results in termination. [Ref. 10]
As explained, the implementation of 107.14 resulted in many different airport
access control systems nationwide. A plan for a national access control system, or
"Universal Access System" (VAS), that would permit transient air crews to carry a single
access control medium which will work at all U.S. airports, is currently under exploration
by the FAA. In October 1993, Congress appropriated 2 million dollars for development
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and testing of this VAS to alleviate the problems associated with the current access
control system. The FAA has used these funds to develop preliminary standards and
functional requirements, and to field test prototype installations. [Ref. 10] However, the
results of these field tests are yet to be unveiled.
While there is a general recognition that a V AS can be a good management
information tool, there is no consensus on how much security is enhanced by such a
system. Even with a sophisticated access control system, security will still depend on
human factors and the procedures for issue and return of employee access cards. How the
VAS will be paid for is another major issue to consider. Possibly a better approach, to
satisfy current needs, would mandate control of access by all employees, combined with
stricter FAA enforcement. Meanwhile, a VAS could be tested, debugged, and refined at
selected airports. [Ref 9]
Airport operators have strongly recommended that the FAA develop technical
specifications for access control systems. This recommendation also was supported by
the General Accounting Office (GAO). [Ref. 7:p.12] Accordingly, the FAA agrees that
there is a need for technical standards and is supporting current efforts to develop them,
but does not consider section 107.14 the proper venue to issue technical standards. [Ref.
11]
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2. l07.25-Airport Identification Media
Most U.S. airports use an airport identification media system of some type to
satisfy the current movement control requirements of 107.14. However, there was not a
specific regulatory requirement to have a system until 19 September 1991 when section
107.25 amended FAR 107, thus providing the requirement to implement this system in
the U.S. Although this section does provide guidance, it is very broad and non-specific
which creates some problems. Due to these problems, employee movements in secure
areas can not be properly accounted for.
Section 107.25 directs employees to display an airport-approved identification
media on their outermost garment at all times when operating in the Security
Identification Display Area (SIDA). All U.S. airports independently determine which
areas are SIDA without FAA consultation. Consequently, while some airports define the
entire AOA as the SIDA, others may only define certain areas in the airport SIDA. This
creates problems for security personnel in that other employees, or anyone for that matter,
may enter and exit non-SIDA controlled areas of the airport without identification. [Ref.
13]
Our research indicates that problems result from the failure to direct airports to
use media that displays accurate information about the individual, bears an expiration
date, and indicates the individual's level ofauthorization for access and movement. [Ref.
13] Further, it institutes broad parameters rather than specific sizes, colors, or actual
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wording that must appear on the media. It also does not provide flexibility to the airports
to accommodate technological advances in media.
Accountability requirements for media are also not included in this regulation.
Accountability requirements ensure the integrity of a system by establishing a periodic
audit and offering media revalidation or reissuance procedures. When there is no
accountability for identification media, the credibility of the system is undermined.
Employees are not required by the regulations (but may be required at individual airports)
to return expired identification media. Security employees are also not required to
safeguard unissued identification media stock and supplies. Many airports have
automated identification systems that conduct audits on a scheduled basis. However,
research indicates that some airports may not accomplish audits regularly, and when
conducted, only after extended periods of time. [Ref. 13]
The FAA views identification systems as one of the most effective means to
control movement in any portion of the ADA. [Ref. 11] Consequently, the FAA
periodically audits some airports to ensure the integrity of an airport's identification
system. The FAA requires airports, via written or verbal notice, to conduct a self
revalidation of its system if 5 percent of identification media is determined
unaccountable. Many airport operators, however, have complained that this 5 percent
requirement requires revalidation or reissuance ofmedia too frequently and does not
account for the operational reality that employees will lose or misplace identification.
Additionally, this may impose serious economic implications and time delays in getting
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the new media to employees depending on the size and operational capacity ofthe
airport. [Ref. 9]
Finally, section 107.25 does not require an airport operator to develop a challenge
program. Some airports establish their own challenge procedures to accommodate this
necessity. However, a consequence of this is that standardized challenge procedures do
not exist between airports. This has resulted in inconsistent challenge procedures among
employees at a given airport, as well as transient air crews who perform their duties at
different airports. As a result, the effectiveness of a fundamental element of the airport
security program is eroded.
3. l08.13-Security ofAirplanes and Facilities
Section 107.13 is concerned with AOA Security by directing air carriers to
prohibit free access to airplanes and facilities. The security of air carrier operations areas
is critical to assuring complete AOA security. If these areas are not secured to the same
level as all other areas within the AOA, the airport is left vulnerable. However, section
108.13 does not address this issue.
It is important to note that although the title of section 108.13 includes
"facilities", it does not specifically address security of facilities in its language.
Additionally, it specifies "airplanes", which does not include rotorcraft or dirigibles by
definition.
There currently exists little control over those having access to aircraft. For
example, caterers are allowed access to the aircraft with few, if any, security checks.
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Cleaning crews also enter aircraft without having their equipment, such as buckets and
vacuum cleaners, screened or examined. Although this section does provide guidance, it
is broad, non-specific and, as a result, leaves airplanes and facilities open to exploitation.
While procedures may exist at airports that require employees to challenge
anyone not wearing proper identification in the SIDA, these procedures can be of limited
effectiveness unless properly enforced. Various methods to encourage more vigorous
challenging have been adopted by some airports, including a reward paid to employees
for challenging unauthorized persons and turning them over to security personnel. [Ref.
9]
Under this section ofFAR 108, the air carrier operator is required to prohibit
unauthorized access to its airplanes, to check baggage and cargo, and conduct a pre-flight
security inspection of the airplane. However, it does not require the air carrier to prevent
access by unauthorized persons to baggage or cargo transported aboard a passenger
aircraft. Since "prohibit" may be interpreted as only requiring placards or warnings on
entrances to the air carrier's operating areas, the air carrier can circumvent proper security
measures in order to maintain passenger throughput.
Our research provides information that further amplifies this point. Entry was
gained into the AOA of an airport, specifically the air carrier operating areas and baggage
handling facilities, by accompanying a security employee wearing identification media.
Once inside these areas, it was noted that challenge to persons not wearing identification
media was virtually nonexistent. Additionally, the ability to access any part of the
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airplane or baggage handling facility was easily accomplished, and went unnoticed by all
but one employee on his lunch break. When challenged, the security employee informed
the employee that we were being escorted and we then continued on our way. [Ref. 13] It
is important to note that we were not wearing any type of escort access media, and
challenge took place long after we had entered the area.
Lastly, section 108.13 does not require air carriers to comply with the vehicle
identification procedures contained in the airport operator's ASP. This is perhaps the
most egregious error in this section. Vehicle access and identification procedures are
essential to mitigating risk ofa major incident in the AOA due to the capacity and
concealability they provide a terrorist and their weapons.
B. EMPLOYEE SCREENING
As of 1991, one in every 15 people employed in the U.S. owed his or her job to
civil aviation. Ofthese 15 million, there are approximately 2.3 million airport and air
carrier employees supporting 5,474 public facilities enplaning approximately 1.6 million
passengers on a daily basis. Of these 2.3 million employees, a vast majority work in, or
have access to, designated security areas on a daily basis. [Ref. 20:p.1] Prior to 26
November 1985, none of these employees were required by FAA to have employment
background checks. [Ref.2:p.43] The regulations do now require background checks,
however, our research indicates that the effectiveness of these checks is debatable.
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1. 107.31 and 108.33-Access Investigation
The current FAA regulations stipulate that all individuals seeking employment at
airport facilities, whether employed with the airport, air carrier, or vender and requiring
unescorted access into the SIDA, must undergo and pass a security background check. As
written, background checks must cover the past 10 ten years ofemployment history and
verification of the 5 preceding years commencing on the date of the investigation. The
purpose of this check is to identify breaks in employment during the preceding 5 year
period, which could indicate criminal history during that period. A noted 12 month gap in
employment history requires the potential employer to conduct a thorough FBI
background investigation.
Our research revealed that this check consists ofan informal telephone
verification ofemployment, usually conducted by a private security firm contracted to
call the applicant's previous employer(s) as appearing on the job application. [Ref.
17:p.4] To avoid detection, applicants with criminal histories need only reference
associates as past employers that could substantiate false employment. This method
appears to be inadequate in that it provides a lesser level of scrutiny than that needed to
properly screen a potential employee. Furthermore, potential employers strongly defend
current procedures, insisting that this check is adequate and is in full compliance with
FAA requirements.
Another problematic issue not considered in employment verification is criminal
work release. Convicted criminals serving less than one year behind bars are able to
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bypass the 12 month gap in employment and hide their crime from this background
verification. This issue provides a breach in security, thereby failing to adequately
provide assurances that personnel with access to the AOA fully qualify for such access.
A probable solution to the deficiencies in employment validation and elimination
of loophole issues is through the use of a secure, accurate screening system. One such
system is the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) located at the Criminal
Justice Information Services Division (CnS). This system is used by the FBI to access
secure intelligence databases necessary to perform organic criminal background and
fingerprinting checks. These checks are highly regarded by some political entities but
considered controversial by others. The Gore Commission suggests that criminal
background checks are a vital security tool and have recommended FBI background and
fingerprint checks for all employees with access to secure areas. [Ref. 1:p.24] Cong~ess,
via passage ofthe 1990 Aviation Security Improvement Act advocates FBI criminal
history checks as did the Bush Commission. However, FBI criminal background checks
have yet to be instituted. Airport law enforcement and airport administrators interviewed
unanimously agreed that FBI checks are necessary but were in disagreement as to how to
conduct this in a timely and cost effective manner.
In sharp contrast to advocates' opinions, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) believes criminal background checks are problematic. The ACLU believes that
the accessibility ofa new government database containing personal information about
employees would be an enormous risk to privacy. Moreover, the ACLU believes that the
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creation and maintenance of such a dynamic data base is prone to inaccuracies leading to
violations of the constitutional rights of innocent employees. [Ref 21 :p.149] The airline
industry believes that criminal background checks are too costly (24 dollars per check),
too time consuming (up to 120 days), and that the terrorist threat is not imminent. [Ref
22:p.5]
Based upon our research, the current system in use nationwide appears ineffective and
easily defeated. It is our opinion that this system should be redesigned or eliminated and a
new system put in place. In the interim, the FBI NCRC should be utilized as it is linked to
federal agencies across the country including FAA and U.S. Customs offices, both located
in domestic and international airports nationwide. The NCRC could be made available to
the Airports' Security Coordinator (ASC) to conduct proper background checks. Though
not all airports currently have direct links to this system, secure internet access is plausible
making this a non-issue. Physical security ofNCRC links is a fundamental concern that
could be easily remedied by placing a secure terminal in a secure location accessible only
by an FBI cleared ASC.
2. 107.2 and 108.4-Falsification
Falsification is an "after the fact phenomena" uncovered primarily through
unrelated investigations such as those performed by Immigration Naturalization Service
(INS), Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), FAA or the local police force. Our research
validated this statement as four of the five airports interviewed admitted to having first
hand knowledge of on-site falsification uncovered through investigation performed by
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one or more of these agencies. For example, an airport operator employment
investigation conducted by the INS in 1995 uncovered 112 illegal aliens cleaning
terminals and aircraft at a Category One airport. All illegal aliens possessed SIDA media
gained through falsified documents submitted by their employer. [Ref. 26:p.1] Though
not all cases are as noteworthy as the this one, the potential for falsification exists and
evidence suggests it can be found at U.S. airports.
Until recently the FAA has appeared to be a legal "toothless tiger" rarely
rendering substantial penalties for such activity. In 1996 the FAA adopted sections 107.2
and 108.4 to prohibit fraudulent or intentional false statements in certain security records.
As a result, they now have the ability to take legal enforcement action against individuals
for falsification.
C. EMPLOYEE TRAINING
The performance and effectiveness of technology at U.S. airports today is linked
directly to the quality and training ofhuman resources. Considerable emphasis must be
placed on recruitment, training, and compensation of these resources in order to provide a
secure industry. It is a common practice for airports and airlines to put their trust in
accessories such as metal detectors and X ray machines costing millions ofdollars and to
spend little on the personnel that operate them. [Ref 23:p.85] Our research indicates that
U.S. airports and air carriers routinely place the decision as to whether or not a plane is
secure in the hands ofpoorly trained, underpaid, unmotivated, and overworked
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employees. [Ref. 23:p.85] Evidence of this was observed and verified at all five
researched airports.
1. l08.31-Employment Standards For Screening Personnel
The only qualifications that the federal government has set for screeners is that
they be able to see, hear, distinguish colors and speak and read English. [Ref. 24:pA]
Screener demographics reflect these minimum requirements as the work force is mostly
made up of entry level adolescents, immigrants, and retired or future law enforcement
personnel [Ref. 25:p.l] Turnover rates ofbetween 200 to 400 percent are the norm and
are directly attributed to many factors, with minimum wage compensation without
insurance benefits in the forefront.
One reason for the low wages is the fierce competition for low bid contracted
security firms which keeps employee compensation low. Specifically, to stay
competitive, some security firms accept a high turnover rate as a trade off to paying
substantially higher hourly wages such as are required by more experienced senior level
screeners. As a result, the screening employee work force is understaffed, under trained,
and highly ineffective when compared to the highly paid, highly trained professional
screeners in Europe. Low pay increases the probability that screeners will engage in
criminal activity to supplement their incomes. An example of this is a recent arrest and
indictment of the security supervisor for LAX for allowing several kilos of cocaine to
routinely pass through security checkpoints in return for compensation from drug
traffickers. [Ref. 27:p.l]
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Federal training standards for employment is a very basic 12 hour training course
with 40 hours of On Job Training (OJT). Beyond setting the core requirements and
guidance for initial, recurrent, and OJT, the FAA allows air carriers, through contracted
security agencies, to design and implement training programs. This has resulted in a
conglomeration of training programs nationwide that vary not only among air carriers,
but also within air carriers. Furthennore, a survey ofeight major air carriers completed
by the Bush Commission indicated that, though all had specialized training curricula for
detection of explosive devices and materials, a standard for this specialized training was
non-existent. [Ref.2:p.55]
Screeners are evaluated annually by local Airport Security Coordinators (ASC)
and by the FAA through unannounced inspections. However, FAA inspection checklists
deliberately make routine screening inspections easy to pass, by allowing only one of
seven kinds offake weapons to be placed in an uncluttered bag, on the premise that a
high rate of failure would show that the airport and security system were in serious
trouble. [Ref. 24:p.2] Inspection pass rates for screeners average around 90 percent,
thereby giving the appearance that the current screening system is successful in detecting
prohibited items. However, when inspections were done using special undercover
inspection teams that are not bound to using regular checklists or test weapons, pass rates
dropped to as low as 20 percent. [Ref. 24:p.2] Moreover, FAA inspection checklists have
not been changed since the inception ofFAR 107 and 108.
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Another type of screener is the air carrier's ticket agent. The FAA places no
specific standard requirement on ticket agents other than the required pre-employment
access investigations and SIDA training. However, the FAA mandates verbal screening
of all domestic and international passengers on baggage packing, baggage ownership, and
baggage security by ticket agents. [Ref. 23:p.88] Without specialized training to perform
this task effectively, it appears that ticket agents are ill prepared and ineffective in
detecting passengers requiring heightened scrutiny. It can be assumed that without
specialized training the possibility ofa breach is heightened especially when dealing with
cantankerous travelers who have been standing in long lines and are eager to be processed
and allowed access to their flight. Under these conditions, ticket agents can be expected
to respond by reducing thorough screening in order to maximize passenger throughput.
An example ofan effective screening system is utilized by EI Al Airlines of
Israel. Unlike the U.s. and Europe, EI Al devotes highly specialized security agents
specifically to screening passengers, thus allowing ticket agents to concentrate on their
primary task-accommodating passengers. EI Al security agents are versed in identifying
suggestive signs oflying, such as eye and body language. [Ref. 23:p.88]
Section 107.25 requires all persons with unescorted access to the SIDA to have
training directly related to SIDA operations. Our research indicates that training is
nothing more than required reading and the viewing ofFAA instructional videotapes
covering basic airport operations. The cumulative time for students to complete training
was dependent upon individual aptitude, though it was noted that even the slowest reader
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could complete the training within one hour. Furthermore, our research indicates that
instruction was dissimilar between airports. Instruction over and above that required by
the FAA was provided at 50 percent of the visited facilities, whereas no instruction was




The best means to address the challenges and issues of the current and
future terrorist threat to civil aviation is to revise current airport and airport operator
security regulations. Based upon issues analyzed in chapter four, this chapter offers
corrective measures for improving (1) Airport and Air Carrier Employee Access Control,
(2) Airport and Air Carrier Employee Screening, and (3) Airport and Air Carrier
Employee Training. The recommendations that follow are based on our field research of
five u.s. airports and examination of the current Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR).
A. ACCESS CONTROL
1. Mandate a Standard AOA Access Control Strategy at all U.S.
Airports
Success in deterring terrorist incidents within the Air Operations Area (AOA) will
depend on the FAA's ability to provide technical standards for a system, method, and/or
procedure to address the problem of employee accountability. Perhaps the most critical
element of this system is for the FAA to mandate that all employees must pass through
security screening checkpoints before accessing the aircraft gate and other restricted areas
of the airport. These checkpoints must include one or more of the following: (1) placing
a guard at each access point to authenticate single-employee access, (2) installing
revolving security doors at access points that allows only one employee through at a time,
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and (3) in the case ofvehicle access, requiring positive identification of all vehicle
occupants.
The cost of these measures is a key decision factor for their procurement. Placing
a guard at each access point incurs labor costs, and revolving doors currently cost
$50,000 each. [Ref. 9] Perhaps a cost effective way for airports to afford these measures
is to reduce the number ofAOA access points and/or utilize Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) Airport Improvement Program (AlP) funds. The AlP is currently
authorized by the FAA for use in airport capital improvement projects such as runways,
roads, terminal expansion, and perimeter security fences. However, improvements to
other security equipment does not qualify for these funds. [Ref. 13] The FAA should
authorize these funds for use in all security improvement projects and allow airport
operators flexibility in implementing the checkpoint system that best suits their needs
from those listed above. This flexibility is paramount in order to minimize expense and
disruptions in efficient employee work routines.
Other corrective measures include removing the requirement that limits employee
access to controlled areas by time and date, implementing mandatory AOA escort
procedures, making the AOA in all U.S. airports a Security Identification Display Area
(SIDA) and establishment of the Universal Access System (VAS) as described in Chapter
IV.
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2. Mandate Standard Airport Identification Media
A standard for operator identification media is the cornerstone ofan effective
access control strategy. A UAS would mandate standard media as part ofits structure.
However, this standard should also mandate control ofaccess media by the Airport
Security Coordinator (ASC), include regular audits of issued access media, and create
measures to ensure that access controls are locally enforced and cannot be used to gain
unauthorized access to the SIDA ofother airports. This media should also display
accurate information about the individual, bear an expiration date, and indicate the
individual's level ofauthorization for access and movement. Further, this standard
should institute specific parameters for media size, color, and wording that must appear
on it.
The FAA should also conduct periodic, unannounced audits ofall U.S. airports to
ensure the integrity of the airport identification media system and fine airports found non-
compliant. These fmes should be placed into the AlP and be authorized by the FAA for
use in security improvement projects. Additionally, the FAA should also survey all
airports and determine an efficient percentage of unaccountable media that is allowable
based upon the characteristics of the airport. This is in lieu ofthe current five percent
requirement described in Chapter IV. Finally, this standard must require airports to
utilize an FAA implemented, standard challenge program.
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3. Mandate the Security ofAirplanes and Facilities subject to Standard
AOA Access Control System Requirements
In order to implement a truly comprehensive AOA access control strategy, the
FAA must require all air carrier's to screen all employees authorized entry into the AOA
by making standard AOA access control standards apply to aircraft and facilities.
The first essential is to redesignate the title ofFederal Aviation Regulation (FAR) section
108.13 to include "aircraft" instead of "airplanes." This would legally bind air carriers to
provide security for all flying vehicles under their control. The second essential element
is watertight control of every means of access to the aircraft through maintenance areas,
cargo sheds, kitchens, other access points from the terminal "buildings, and from outside
the airport. These access points should be monitored by airport security staff checking
identification media, using metal and explosive detectors and, where necessary, hand
search. All cargo and kitchen supplies should be similarly monitored. Vapor sniffing
equipment should also be utilized to detect drugs, other contraband and explosives.
Third, every employee issued identification media giving access to the ADA (engineers,
cleaners, kitchen, fuel and cargo handlers, transient air crews, etc.) should have
successfully passed a background security check prior to employment. Their
identification media should contain data designed to prevent impersonation. Finally,
particular care should be taken to confirm identification and otherwise control transient
air crews. Because oftheir transient nature, the presence of these crews may represent a
weak link in the security system for infiltration.
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B. SCREENING
1. Mandate Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Background and
Fingerprint Checks for all Airport and Airline Employees
Failure to thoroughly screen employees having access to secure airport areas can
sharply undermine the capability of an Airport Security Program (ASP) and result in
disastrous consequences. Telephone verification ofan employee's precursory five year
employment history is ineffective, easily subverted, and has problematic loopholes. The
best way to ensure the integrity ofemployees is for the FAA to mandate FBI background
and fingerprint checks for all employees. The following steps can be taken by the FAA in
this regard:
1. Utilize the FBI's National Crime Information Center (NCIC) 2000 system at
Category X, One, Two and Three airports to perform background and
fingerprint checks. Solicit the FBI to provide training and certification for
both FAA personnel and ASC's on this system. Once certified, ASC's will be
primarily responsible for performing all checks with the FAA maintaining
responsibility for system oversight.
2. Institute new standards for background investigations. Standards should
consider ACLU concerns while providing clear concise policy and procedures.
3. Prioritize checks so that new hires are scrutinized first. Current employees
should be temporarily grandfathered to avoid extensive backlogs and system
overload. All employees should be screened within a 2 year period.
63
2. Prosecute all Entities Engaged in Falsification of Security Records
A chain is only as strong as its weakest linle Falsification is the link most likely
to cause failure of a well developed security chain. The FAA must make public examples
of all engaged in such activities by prosecuting and heavily fining them according to the
violation and place fines into the AlP. Stiff financial penalties, incarceration, and/or
industry humiliation should deter such activities.
3. Require Airlines to Hire Professional Passenger Screening Personnel
The practice ofusing ticket agents as a front line of defense in screening
passengers is ineffective. Adopting EI Al Airline's practice ofhiring only highly trained
security agents that are well versed in identifying signs ofdeception can greatly enhance
security. The ticket agent's job is to assist in getting passengers their scheduled flight,
not keep them off. [Ref. 23':p.88] Although this measure may increase labor costs, and
would most likely disproportionately impact smaller, less prosperous airports, it is yet
another measure that could be funded by the Airport Improvement Program (AlP).
C. TRAINING
1. Intensify Employment Standards and Employee Training
The FAA has failed to provide adequate baseline requirements and standards for
both employee hiring and training. As a result, security is placed in the hands of
underpaid, untrained, unmotivated, and overworked workforce who are given little
incentive to feel good about themselves or their jobs. Turnover rates in these jobs are
currently at epidemic 200 to 400 percent, and minimum wage pay may create an
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incentive for some employees to engage in criminal activities to supplement their income.
Some industry officials feel that training and skill levels are so poor that efforts to
implement new Explosive Detection System (EDS) technologies are being held back.
[Ref. 24:p.3]
In light of these factors, the FAA should mandate measures which accomplish the
following objectives and thereby establish a more effective employment and training
system:
1. Raise the quality of security personnel by choosing bright, educated people;
training them well; testing them frequently; and paying them a decent wage.
At $5.60 an hour, you get what you pay for.
2. Develop universal performance standards for selection, training, certification
and recertification of screening companies and their employers. [Ref. 1:p.28]
3. Deploy state of the art computerized training and testing systems. One such
current system, called "SPEARS," projects computer generated images of
hundreds ofdifferent kinds ofweapons carried inside passenger luggage on a
screener's X ray monitor.
As previously mentioned, the AIP could be used to fund these measures.
2. Revise FAA Security Inspection Rules and Practices to Realistically
Assess the Security System and Provide Employee Training
Inspection rules and practices developed in the 1970's must be updated to 1990's
standards. The FAA's Civil Aviation Security (ACS) agents must create and utilize a
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revised and realistic airport security inspection checklist so as to fully test the security
system. The current checklist is inadequate in that it deliberately makes routine screening
inspections easy to pass, and only allows one of seven different types of imitation
weapons to be used in inspections.
Our research found that the FAA makes airport security inspections easy to pass
so that, statistically, the airport and the FAA appear successful in the provision of an
effective security system. The FAA maintains that the current inspection criteria and
security system adequately address the threat. However, by allowing easy inspections,
the credibility of the system is undermined. The employees being inspected do not
currently receive training from the FAA in conjunction with the inspection. In order to
create effective airport security inspection procedure, the FAA needs to provide a number
of cyclical, scheduled assist visits to airports and provide training to employees in the
proper security procedures and regulations. The FAA should complete the training cycle
by conducting an inspection and fining employees and operators for discrepancies. These
fines would then be placed into the AlP. Fining employees and operators establishes an
incentive to properly provide security at our nations' airports.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The number of civil aviation incidents worldwide has dropped by nearly two
thirds from 1992 to 1996. [Ref. 6:p.50] This, however, has not translated into a
corresponding decline in the threat to U.S. civil aviation interests, as indicated in Chapter
II. There is every reason to believe that civil aviation will continue to be an attractive
target for terrorist groups. This threat will remain significant in the foreseeable future,
and the fact that some years pass with fewer incidents does not necessarily indicate that
the threat has diminished.
The U.S. has enjoyed a benign history ofpersistent terrorist incidents. However,
threats initiating from Middle East adversaries in response to our military and foreign
policies, the destruction of the Oklahoma City Federal Building, and the bombing ofthe
New York city World Trade Center all suggest that threats persist and can be
catastrophic. Success in deterring threats to the civil aviation industry rests upon revision
ofthe FAA airport and airport operator security regulations analyzed in this thesis to
adequately address this issue.
This last chapter is presented in three sections. The first section describes the
current state ofemployee-related security as determined by our examination of the
regulations and field research at five U.S. airports. Solutions for these problems are
provided in the second section. The first two sections recapitulate material respectively




a. A Standard Air Operations Area (AOA) Access
Control Strategy does not exist at all U.S. Airports
The implementation of 107.14 produced many different access control
systems nationwide as the FAA did not mandate a standard access control system in all
U.S. airports. Due to this, integration of the myriad ofaccess control systems nationwide
is impossible. Among other consequences, airports are not able to access information on
transient personnel and adequately scrutinize their identity.
As indicated in Chapter IV, a benefit of non-standardization is that most
U.S. airports are able to choose the system that allows them to focus on facilitating
greater passenger convenience and throughput, therefore resulting in better utilization of
aircraft and ultimately achieving greater airport revenues. However, consequences of
non-standardization outweigh the benefits. Non-standardization does not effectively
offer the U.S. air travel industry the consistent level ofprotection needed to counter
modem terrorism but rather offers the terrorist windows ofopportunity to engage their
tactics.
b. Standard Airport Identification Media is not Utilized
Problems result from the failure to direct airports to use media that
displays accurate information about the individual, bears an expiration date, and indicates
the individual's level of authorization for access and movement. [Ref. 13] Further, the
current regulations institute broad parameters rather than specific sizes, colors, or actual
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wording that must appear on the media. It also does not provide flexibility to the airports
to accommodate technological advances in media.
Accountability requirements for media are also not included in this
regulation. Accountability requirements ensure the integrity of a system by establishing a
periodic audit and offering media revalidation or reissuance procedures. Employees are
not required by the regulations, (but may be required at individual airports), to return
expired identification media. Security employees are also not required to safeguard
unissued identification media stock and supplies. Some airports may not accomplish
audits regularly, and when conducted, only after extended periods oftime. [Ref 13]
Additionally, standardized challenge procedures do not exist between airports. This has
resulted in inconsistent challenge procedures among employees at a given airport, as well
as with transient air crews who perform their duties at different airports.
c. The Security ofAirplanes and Facilities is not subject to
Standard AOA Access Control System Requirements
Under this section ofFAR 108, the air carrier operator is required to
prohibit unauthorized access to its airplanes, to check baggage and cargo, and conduct a
pre-flight security inspection of the airplane. However, it does not require the air carrier
to prevent access by unauthorized persons to baggage or cargo transported aboard a
passenger aircraft. "Prohibit" may be interpreted as only placing placards or warnings on
entrances to the air carrier's operating areas, so that the air carrier can circumvent proper
security measures in order to maintain passenger throughput.
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2. SCREENING
a. Federal Bureau of Investigation Background and Fingerprint
Checks for Airport and Airline Employees are not Required
Pre employment screening for individuals seeking positions with
unescorted access to high level airport security areas is less than that required for
employment in a bank or child care center. FAA regulations mandate nothing more than
documentation of an applicant's past 10 year employment history. Accurate information
on an applicant based upon this time period is sometimes difficult to acquire or is
falsified. Therefore, individuals with questionable backgrounds may attain employment
and unimpeded access to airport facilities and aircraft.
Federal Bureau ofInvestigation (FBI) background and fingerprint checks
have yet to be mandated by the FAA. This is mainly due to strong opposition by the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) and the airline industry.
b. Falsification of Security Records is Problematic
Falsification of security documentation is a common occurrence and has
led to serious breeches ofairport security areas. Four of five airports interviewed
identified cases offalsification at their facilities uncovered by federal and local police
agencies performing investigations unrelated to employment. Falsification is a universal
activity performed not only by employees but unscrupulous employers seeking to
minimize manpower costs as noted in Chapter IV. The security of air travelers cannot be
assured until the integrity ofour nation's aviation workforce is certain.
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c. Ticket Agents are III Prepared to Screen Passengers
FAA mandates requiring air carriers to perform verbal passenger screening
is delegated to ticket agents who have neither the formal training or practical experience
to perform such. Ticket agents are ill prepared to effectively scrutinize passengers and
identify suggestive signs of lying, such as eye contact and body language. When agents
are confronted with long lines of irritable passengers they often tend to concentrate on
maximization of throughput at the expense of thorough verbal screening.
3. TRAINING
a. Employee Standards and Training are Questionable
The only qualifications that the federal government has set for screeners is
that they be able to see, hear, distinguish colors and speak and read English. [Ref24:p.4].
Screener demographics reflect these minimum requirements as the workforce is made up
ofentry level adolescents, immigrants, and retired law enforcement personnel, all of
which contribute to a 200 to 400 percent annual turnover rate nationwide. Training
requirements mandated by FAA are nothing more than a very basic 12 hour training
course with 40 hours ofon the job training. As a result screener inspection pass rates
have dropped as low as 20 percent at some facilities inspected by undercover FAA
inspectors.
b. FAA Inspection Rules and Practices are Ineffective and
Outdated
Inspection rules and practices have not been substantially changed or
modified since the inception ofFAR 107 and 108. Current FAA inspection checklist
criteria deliberately makes routine screening inspections easy to pass, by allowing only
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one of seven kinds of fake weapons to be placed in an uncluttered bag. [Ref. 24:p. 2]
Additionally, the employees being inspected do not currently receive training from the
FAA in conjunction with the inspection. The FAA maintains that the current inspection
criteria and security system adequately address the threat. However, this position is
questionable.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
Success in deterring threats to the civil aviation industry rests upon revision of the
FAA airport and airport operator security regulations analyzed in this thesis. Without
question, the U.S. civil aviation industry needs revised security regulations to adequately
counter the threat ofterrorism.
Based upon issues explored previously, this section offers recommendations for
improving: (1) Airport and Air Carrier Employee Access Control, (2) Airport and Air
Carrier Employee Screening, and (3) Airport and Air Carrier Employee Training.
1. Access Control
a. Mandate a Standard Air Operations Area (AOA) Access
Control Strategy at all U.S. Airports
The FAA should mandate and subsidize implementation ofthe Universal
Access System" (VAS) and mandate that all employees must pass through security
screening checkpoints before accessing the aircraft gate and other restricted areas of the
airport. These checkpoints must include one or more of the following: (1) placing a
guard at each access point to authenticate single-employee access, (2) installing revolving
security doors at access points that allows only one employee through at a time, and (3) in
the case ofvehicle access, require positive. identification ofall vehicle occupants.
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Additionally, the FAA should remove the requirement that limits
employee access to controlled areas by time and date, implement mandatory AOA escort
procedures, and make the AOA in all U.S. airports a Security Identification Display Area
(SIDA).
b. Mandate Standard Airport Identification Media
A UAS would mandate standard media as part of its structure. However,
this standard should also mandate control of access media by the Airport Security
Coordinator (ASC), include regular audits of issued access media, and create measures to
ensure that access controls are locally enforced and cannot be used to gain unauthorized
access to the SIDA ofother airports. This media should also display accurate information
about the individual, bear an expiration date, and indicate the individual's level of
authorization for access and movement. Further, this standard should institute specific
parameters for media size, color, and wording that must appear on it. The FAA should
also conduct periodic, unannounced audits ofall U.S. airports, implement a standard
challenge system, and determine the best percentage of unaccountable media allowed
based upon an airport's operating characteristics.
c. Mandate the Security ofAirplanes and Facilities subject
to Standard AOA Access Control System Requirements
The FAA should require all air carrier's to screen all employees authorized
entry into the AOA by making standard AOA access control standards apply to aircraft
and facilities. The FAA should redesignate the title ofFederal Aviation Regulation
(FAR) section 108.13 to include "aircraft" instead of "airplanes," and maintain watertight
control ofevery means of access to the aircraft through maintenance areas, cargo sheds,
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kitchens, other access points from the tenninal buildings, and from outside the airport by
staffing these areas with security employees. Finally, the FAA should mandate that every
employee issued identification media giving access to the ADA, must have successfully
passed a background security check prior to their employment.
2. SCREENING
a. Mandate Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Background
and Fingerprint Checks for all Airport and Airline Employees
Telephone verification ofan employee's precursory five year employment
history is ineffective, easily subverted, and has problematic loopholes. The best way to
ensure the integrity ofemployees is for the FAA to mandate FBI background and
fingerprint checks for all employees. The FAA should: (1) utilize the FBI's National
Crime Infonnation Center (NCIC) 2000 system at Category X, One, Two and Three
airports to perform background and fingerprint checks, (2) institute new standards for
background investigations, and (3) prioritize checks so that new hires are scrutinized first.
All employees should be screened within a 2 year period.
b. Prosecute all Falsifications of Security Records
The FAA should make public examples of all engaged in security record
falsification by prosecuting and heavily fining them according to the violation. Stiff
financial penalties, incarceration, and/or industry humiliation should deter such activities.
c. Require Airlines to Hire Professional Passenger Screening
Personnel
The practice ofusing ticket agents as a front line ofdefense in screening
passengers is ineffective. Adopting EI AI Airline's practice ofhiring only highly trained
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security agents that are well versed in identifying signs of deception can greatly enhance
security.
3. TRAINING
a. Intensify Employment Standards and Employee Training
The FAA should: (1) raise the quality of security personnel through the
selection process, training and testing programs, and wage levels, (2) develop universal
performance standards for the selection, training, certification and recertification of
screening companies and their employees, and (3) deploy state of the art computerized
training and testing systems.
b. Revise FAA Security Inspection Rules and Practices to
Realistically Assess the Security System and Provide Employee
Training
The FAA must create and utilize a revised and realistic airport security
inspection checklist so as to fully test the security system. In order to create effective
airport security inspection procedure, the FAA needs to provide a number ofcyclical,
scheduled assist visits to airports and provide training to employees in the proper security
procedures and regulations. The FAA should complete the training cycle by conducting
an inspection and fining employees and operators for discrepancies.
c. SUMMARY
The FAA and U.S. airports, in particular, are the intended primary beneficiaries of
this research. The FAA, and airport officials and planners may be able to apply the
information gained to possibly improve the overall security of the U.S. air travel system.
Through this research, a more effective practice of individual and corporate responsibility
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for complying with security regulations may be achieved for all u.s. Category X, One,
Two, Three, Four and Five airports.
The Department OfDefense (DOD) may also benefit from these findings in
managing the operations ofcommon user air lift terminals such as Naval Air Station
(NAS) Norfolk, Dover Air Force Base (AFB), and Travis AFB in peacetime and in war.
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APPENDIX
This appendix provides the official FAA form ofFAR 107 and 108 as provided
by the U.S. Federal Register.
A. FAR 107 AND 108
1. Airport Access Control
Sec. 107.14-Access Control System.
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b) of this section, each operator ofan airport
regularly serving scheduled passenger operations conducted in airplanes having a
passenger seating configuration of more than 60 seats shall submit to the Director of
Civil Aviation Security (ACS), for approval and inclusion in its approved security
program, an amendment to provide for a system, method, or procedure which meets the
requirements specified in this paragraph for controlling access to secured areas of the
airport. The system, method, or procedure shall ensure that only those persons authorized
to have access to secured areas by the airport operator's security program are able to
obtain that access and shall specifically provide a means to ensure that such access is
denied immediately at the access point or points to individuals whose authority to have
access changes. The system, method, or procedure shall provide a means to differentiate
between persons authorized to have access to only a particular portion of the secured
areas and persons authorized to have access only to other portions or to the entire secured
area. The system, method, or procedure shall be capable of limiting an individual's
access by time and date.
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(b) The Director ofACS will approve an amendment to an airport operator's
security program that provides for the use ofan alternative system, method, or procedure
if, in the Director's judgment, the alternative would provide an overall level of security
equal to that which would be provided by the system, method, or procedure described in
paragraph (a) ofthis section.
(c) Each airport operator shall submit the amendment to its approved security
program required by paragraph (a) or (b) ofthis section according to the following
schedule:
(1) By August 8, 1989, or by 6 months after becoming subject to this
section, whichever is later, for airports where at least 25 million persons are
screened annually or airports that have been designated by the Director of Civil
Aviation Security. The amendment shall specify that the system, method, or
procedure must be fully operational within 18 months after the date on which an
airport operator's amendment to its approved security program is approved by the
Director ofACS.
(2) By August 8, 1989, or by 6 months after becoming subject to this
section, whichever is later, for airports where more than 2 million persons are
screened annually. The amendment shall specify that the system, method, or
procedure must be fully operational within 24 months after the date on which an
airport operator's amendment to its approved security program is approved by the
Director ofACS.
(3) By February 8, 1990, or by 12 months after becoming subject to this
section, whichever is later, for airports where at least 500,000 but not more than 2
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million persons are screened annually. The amendment shall specify that the
system, method, or procedure must be fully operational within 30 months after the
date on which an airport operator's amendment to its approved security program
is approved by the Director ofACS.
(4) By February 8, 1990, or by 12 months after becoming subject to this
section, whichever is later, for airports where less than 500,000 persons are
screened annually. The amendment shall specify that the system, method, or
procedure must be fully operational within 30 months after the date on which an
airport operator's amendment to its approved security program is approved by the
Director of ACS.
(d) Notwithstanding paragraph (c) of this section, an airport operator of a newly
constructed airport commencing initial operation after December 31, 1990, as an airport
subject to paragraph (a) ofthis section, shall include as part of its original airport security
program to be submitted to the FAA for approval a fully operational system, method, or
procedure in accordance with this section.
Sec. l07.25-Airport identification media.
(a) As used in this section, Security Identification Display Area (SIDA) means
any area identified in the airport security program as requiring each person to
continuously display on their outermost garment, an airport-approved identification
medium unless under airport-approved escort.
(b) After January 1, 1992, an airport operator may not issue to any person any
identification media that provides unescorted access to any security identification display
79
area unless the person has successfully completed training in accordance with an FAA-
approved curriculum specified in the security program.
(c) By October 1, 1992, not less than 50 percent ofall individuals possessing
airport-issued identification that provides unescorted access to any security identification
display area at that airport shall have been trained in accordance with an FAA-approved
curriculum specified in the security program.
(d) After May 1, 1993, an airport operator may not permit any person to possess
any airport-issued identification medium that provides unescorted access to any security
identification display area at that airport unless the person has successfully completed
FAA-approved training in accordance with a curriculum specified in the security
program.
(e) The curriculum specified in the security program shall detail the methods of
instruction, provide attendees the opportunity to ask questions, and include at least the
following topics:
(1) Control, use, and display ofairport-approved identification or access
media.
(2) Challenge procedures and the law enforcement response which
supports the challenge procedure.
(3) Restrictions on divulging information concerning an act of unlawful
interference with civil aviation if such information is likely to jeopardize the
safety of domestic or international aviation.
(4) Non-disclosure of information regarding the airport security system or
any airport tenant's security systems.
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(5) Any other topics deemed necessary by the Assistant Administrator for
ACS.
(f) No person may use any airport-approved identification medium that provides
unescorted access to any security identification display area to gain such access unless
that medium was issued to that person by the appropriate airport authority or other entity
whose identification is approved by the airport operator.
(g) The airport operator shall maintain a record of all training given to each
person under this section until 180 days after the termination of that person's unescorted
access privileges.
Sec. l08.13-Security of airplanes and facilities.
Each certificate holder required to conduct screening under a security program
shall use the procedures included, and the facilities and equipment described, in its
approved security program to perform. the following control functions with respect to
each airplane operation for which screening is required:
(a) Prohibit un,authorized access to the airplane.
(b) Ensure that baggage carried in the airplane is checked in by a responsible
agent and that identification is obtained from persons, other than known shippers,
shipping goods or cargo aboard the airplane.
(c) Ensure that cargo and checked baggage carried aboard the airplane is handled
in a manner that prohibits unauthorized access.
(d) Conduct a security inspection of the airplane before placing it in service and
after it has been left unattended.
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2. Operator Screening
Sec. 107.2 and 108A-Falsification.
No person may make, or cause to be made, any of the following:
(a) Any fraudulent or intentionally false statement in any application for any
security program, access medium, or identification medium, or any amendment thereto,
under this part.
(b) Any fraudulent or intentionally false entry in any record or report that is kept,
made, or used to show compliance with this part, or exercise any privileges under this
part.
(c) Any reproduction or alteration, for fraudulent purpose, of any report, record,
security program, access medium, or identification medium issued under this part.
Sec. 107.31 and 108.33-Access Investigation.
(a) On or after January 31, 1996, this section applies to all individuals seeking
authorization for, or seeking authority to authorize others to have, unescorted access
privileges to the SIDA that is identified in the airport security program as defined by Sec.
107.25.
(b) Except as provided in paragraph (e) of this section, each airport operator must
ensure that no individual is granted authorization for, or is granted authority to authorize
others to have, unescorted access to the area identified in paragraph (a) ofthis section
unless:
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(1) The individual has satisfactorily undergone a review covering the past
10 years of employment history and verification of the 5 years preceding the date
the access investigation is initiated as provided in paragraph (c) of this section.
(2) The results of the access investigation do not disclose that the
individual has been convicted or found not guilty by reason of insanity, in any
jurisdiction, during the 10 years ending on the date of such investigation, ofa
crime involving any of the following crimes enumerated in paragraphs (b)(2)(i)
through (xxv) of this section. Where specific citations are listed, both the current
citation and the citation that applied before the statutes are recodified in 1994 are
listed.
(i) Forgery of certificates, false making of aircraft, and other
aircraft registration violations, 49 U.S.C. 46306 [formerly 49 U.S.C. App.
1472 (b)].
(ii) Interference with air navigation, 49 U.S.C. 46308, [formerly
49 U.S.C. App 1472 (c)].
(iii) Improper transportation ofa hazardous material, 49 U.S.C.
46312, formerly 49 U.S.C. App 1472(b)(2)].
(iv) Aircraft piracy, 49 U.S.C. 46502, [formerly 49 U.S.C. App
1472(i).
(v) Interference with flightcrew members or flight attendants, 49
U.S.C. 46504, [formerly 49 U.S.C. App 14720)].
(vi) Commission ofcertain crimes aboard aircraft in flight, 49
U.S.C. 46506, [formerly 49 U.S.C. App 1472(k)].
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(vii) Carrying a weapon or explosive aboard an aircraft, 49 U.S.C.
46505 [fonnerly 49 U.S.C. App 1472(1)].
(viii) Conveying false infonnation and threats, 49 U.S.C. 49
46507 [fonnerly 49 U.S.C. App 1472 (m)].
(ix) Aircraft piracy outside the special aircraft jurisdiction of the
United States, 49 U.S.C. 46502(b), [fonnerly 49 U.S.C. App 1472(n)].
(x) Lighting violations involving transporting controlled
substances, 49 U.S.C. 46315, [fonnerly 49 U.S.C. App 1472(q)].
(xi) Unlawful entry into an aircraft or airport area that serves air
carriers or foreign air carriers contrary to established security
requirements, 49 U.S.C. 46314, [fonnerly 49 U.S.C. App 1472(r)].
(xii) Destruction of an aircraft or aircraft facility, 18 U.S.C. 32.
(xiii) Murder.
(xiv) Assault with intent to murder.
(xv) Espionage.
(xvi) Sedition.
(xvii) Kidnapping or hostage taking.
(xviii) Treason.
(xix) Rape or aggravated sexual abuse.
(xx) Unlawful possession, use, sale, distribution, or manufacture




(xxiii) Distribution of, or intent to distribute, a controlled
substance.
(xxiv) Felony arson.
(xxv) Conspiracy or attempt to commit any of the aforementioned
criminal acts.
(c) The access investigation must include the following steps:
(1) The individual must complete an application form that includes:
(i) The individual's full name, including any aliases or nicknames.
(ii) The dates, names, phone numbers, and addresses ofprevious
employers, with explanations for any gaps in employment ofmore than 12
months, during the previous la-year period.
(iii) Notification that the individual will be subject to an
employment history verification and possibly a criminal history records
check.
(iv) Any convictions during the previous la-year period of the
crimes listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section.
(2) The identity of the individual must be verified through the
presentation oftwo forms of identification, one ofwhich must bear the
individual's photograph.
(3) The information on the most recent 5 years ofemployment history
required under paragraph (c)(l)(ii) of this section must be verified in writing, by
documentation, by telephone, or in person.
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(4) If one or more of the following conditions exists, the access
investigation must not be considered complete unless it includes a check ofthe
individual's fingerprint-based criminal history record maintained by the FBI. The
airport operator may request a check of the individual's fmgerprint-based criminal
history record only ifone or more of the following conditions exists:
(i) The individual cannot satisfactorily account for a period of
unemployment of 12 months or more during the previous 10-year period.
(ii) The individual is unable to support statements made or there
are significant inconsistencies between information provided on the
application in response to questions required by paragraph (c)(1 )(ii) of this
section and that obtained through the 5-year verification process.
(iii) Information becomes available to the airport operator during
the access investigation indicating a possible conviction for one of the
disqualifying crimes.
(d) An airport operator may permit an individual to be under escort as
defined in Sec. 107.1 in accordance with the airport security program to the areas
identified in paragraph (a) of this section.
(e) Notwithstanding the requirements of this section, an airport operator
may authorize the following individuals to have unescorted access to the areas
identified in paragraph (a) of this section:
(1) Employees of the Federal government or a state or local
government (including law enforcement officers) who, as a condition of
employment, have been subject to an employment investigation.
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(2) Crew members of foreign air carriers covered by an alternate
security arrangement in the approved airport operator security program.
(3) An individual who has been continuously employed in a
position requiring unescorted access by another airport operator, airport
tenant or air carrier.
(4) An individual who has access authority to the U.S. Customs
Service security area of the U.S. airport.
(f) An airport operator will be deemed to be in compliance with its
obligations under paragraphs (b)(l) and (b)(2) of this section, as applicable, when
it accepts certification from:
(1) An air carrier subject to Sec. 108.33 of this chapter that the air
carrier has complied with Sec. 108.33 (a)(1) and (a)(2) for its employees
and contractors.
(2) An airport tenant other than a U.S. air carrier that the tenant
has complied with paragraph (b)(1) of this section for its employees.
(g) The airport operator must designate the airport security coordinator to
be responsible for:
(1) Reviewing and controlling the results of the access
investigation.
(2) Serving as the contact to receive notification from an
individual applying for unescorted access of his or her intent to seek
correction ofhis or her criminal history record with the FBI.
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(h) Prior to commencing the criminal history records check, the airport
operator must notify the affected individuals.
(i) The airport operator must collect and process fingerprints in the
following manner:
(l) One set of legible and classifiable fingerprints must be
recorded on fingerprint cards approved by the FBI for this purpose.
(2) The fingerprints must be obtained from the individual under
direct observation by the airport operator.
(3) The identity ofthe individual must be verified at the time
fingerprints are obtained. The individual must present two forms of
identification media, one ofwhich must bear his or her photograph.
(4) The fingerprint card must be forwarded to Federal Aviation
Administration, 800 Independence Ave., S.W., Washington, D.C. 20591
(AT1N: ACO-310, Access Processing).
(5) Fees for the processing of the criminal checks are due upon
application. Airport operators shall submit payment through corporate
check, cashier's check or money order made payable to "u.s. FAA," at the
rate of $24.00 for each fmgerprint card. Combined payment for multiple .
applications is acceptable.
G) In conducting the criminal history records check required by this
section, the airport operator must ascertain information on arrests for the crimes
listed in paragraph (b)(2) ofthis section for which no disposition has been
recorded to make a determination of the outcome ofthe arrest.
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(k) The airport operator must:
(1) At the time the fingerprints are taken, notify the individual that
a copy of any criminal history record received from the FBI will be made
available if requested in writing.
(2) Prior to making a final decision to deny authorization for
unescorted access, advise the individual that the FBI criminal history
record discloses information that would disqualify him or her from
unescorted access authorization and provide each affected individual with
a copy ofhis or her FBI record ifit has been requested. The individual
may contact the local jurisdiction responsible for the information and the
FBI to complete or correct the information contained in the record before
any final access decision is made, subject to the following conditions:.
(i) Within 30 days after being advised that the FBI criminal
history record discloses disqualifying information, the individual
must notify the airport operator, in writing, ofhis or her intent to
correct any information believed to be inaccurate. Ifno
notification is received within 30 days, the airport operator may
make a final access decision.
(ii) Upon notification by the individual that a record has
been corrected, the airport operator must obtain a copy of the
revised FBI record prior to making a final access decision.
(3) Notify an individual that a final decision has been made to
grant or deny authorization for unescorted access.
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(1) Any individual authorized to have unescorted access privilege to the
areas identified in paragraph (a) of this section who is subsequently convicted of
any of the crimes listed in paragraph (b)(2) of this section must report the
conviction and surrender the SIDA identification medium within 24 hours to the
issuer.
(m) Criminal history record information provided by the FBI must be
used solely for the purposes of this section, and no person shall disseminate the
results of a criminal history records check to anyone other than:
(l) The individual to whom the record pertains or that individual's
authorized representative.
(2) The airport operator.
(3) Others designated by the Administrator.
(n) The airport must maintain a written record for each individual until
180 days after the termination of the individual's authority for unescorted access.
The records for each individual subject to:
(l) The access investigation must include: the application, the
employment verification information obtained by the employer, the names
of those from whom the employment verification information was
obtained, the date the contact was made, or certification of same from air
carriers ofairport tenants, and any other information as required by the
Assistant Administrator for ACS.
(2) A criminal history records check must include the results of
the records check, or a certification by the airport operator or air carrier
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that the check was completed and did not uncover a disqualifying
conviction. These records must be maintained in a manner that protects
the confidentiality of the employee, which is acceptable to the Assistant
Administrator for ACS.
3. Operator Training
Sec. l08.31-Employment standards for screening personnel.
(a) No certificate holder shall use any person to perform any screening function,
unless that person has:
(l) A high school diploma, a General Equivalency Diploma, or a
combination of education and experience which the certificate holder has
determined to have equipped the person to perform the duties of the position.
(2) Basic aptitudes and physical abilities including color perception,
visual and aural acuity, physical coordination, and motor skills to the following
standards:
(i) Screeners operating X-ray equipment must be able to
distinguish on the X-ray monitor the appropriate imaging standard
specified in the certificate holder's security program. Wherever the X-ray
system displays colors, the operator must be able to perceive each color.
(ii) Screeners operating any screening equipment must be able to
distinguish each color displayed on every type of screening equipment and
explain what each color signifies.
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(iii) Screeners must be able to hear and respond to the spoken
voice and to audible alarms generated by screening equipment in an active
checkpoint environment.
(iv) Screeners performing physical searches or other related
operations must be able to efficiently and thoroughly manipulate and
handle such baggage, containers, and other objects subject to security
processing.
(v) Screeners who perform pat-downs or hand-held metal detector
searches ofpersons must have sufficient dexterity and capability to
conduct those procedures on all parts of the persons' bodies.
(3) The ability to read, speak, and write English well enough to:
(i) Carry out written and oral instructions regarding the proper
performance of screening duties.
(ii) Read English language identification media, credentials,
airline tickets, and labels on items normally encountered in the screening
process.
(iii) Provide direction to and understand and answer questions
from English-speaking persons undergoing screening.
(iv) Write incident reports and statements and log entries into
security records in the English language.
(4) Satisfactorily completed all initial, recurrent, and appropriate
specialized training required by the certificate holder's security program.
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(b) Notwithstanding the provisions ofparagraph (a)(4) of this section, the
certificate holder may use a person during the on-the-job portion of training to perform
security functions provided that the person is closely supervised and does not make
independent judgments as to whether persons or property may enter a sterile area or
aircraft without further inspection.
(c) No certificate holder shall use a person to perform a screening function after
that person has failed an operational test related to that function until that person has
successfully completed the remedial training specified in the certificate holder's security
program.
(d) Each certificate holder shall ensure that a Ground Security Coordinator
conducts and documents an annual evaluation ofeach person assigned screening duties
and may continue that person's employment in a screening capacity only upon the
determination by that Ground Security Coordinator that the person:
(1) Has not suffered a significant diminution ofany physical ability
required to perform a screening function since the last evaluation ofthose
abilities.
(2) Has a satisfactory record ofperformance and attention to duty.
(3) Demonstrates the current knowledge and skills necessary to
courteously, vigilantly, and effectively perform screening functions.
(e) Paragraphs (a) through (d) of this section do not apply to those screening
functions conducted outside the United States over which the certificate holder does not
have operational control.
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(f) At locations outside the United States where the certificate holder has
operational control over a screening function, the certificate holder may use screeners
who do not meet the requirements ofparagraph (a)(3) of this section, provided that at
least one representative of the certificate holder who has the ability to functionally read
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